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EDITORIAL 
 
AMBIGUOUS LEGAL ISSUES             
IN INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AND AUDITS 
 
It gives us great pleasure to introduce you to our second edition of the Compliance  
Elliance Journal (CEJ).  
 
This edition, we have chosen to focus on “Ambiguous Legal Issues in Internal Investiga-
tions and Audits” given the rise in number and significance of internal corporate inves-
tigations worldwide.  There are attributing factors to this growth.  First, internal investi-
gations enable control over the facts of the case and technology has increased the ability 
to attain data.  The results of internal investigations enable corporations to thoroughly 
consider when and where they report facts to the public as well as to the authorities. 
Second, the declining resources of the investigating authorities play as vital a role as the 
growing complexity of the cases does. Indeed, the process and oversight of Internal In-
vestigations has become a market itself. Corporations utilize internal and external ex-
perts and consultant to help conduct and analyze the results of internal investigations.  
Third, internal investigations are not only an opportunity to earn (or spend) money but 
also a Bermuda triangle of legal risks for corporations in any country. We believe we can 
learn from each other by sharing information and commentary about this rich risky 
market. For these reasons, we have chosen to dedicate an entire edition of CEJ to risks 
and rewards of internal investigations. 
 
Our current edition begins with the author Lucian E. Dervan. In “Internal Investigati-
ons and the Evolving Fate of Privilege“, he provides valuable insights regarding internal 
investigations from the US perspective. In our second piece, entitled “Ambiguities in 
International Internal Investigations”, Dr. Christian Pelz deals with the international 
aspects of internal investigations, including the criminal liability risks to which the inves-
tigated corporate employees are exposed. Thereafter follows a depiction of internal in-
vestigations under existing German law in the article “Collecting Evidence in Internal 
Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings“ written by Dr. Sascha Süße 
and Carolin Püschel. 
 
The journal then turns to the means used to conduct investigations and expose malfea-
sance:  technology and big data.  In his essay, “How to Conduct E-Mail Reviews in 
Germany,” Tim Wybitul emphasizes, among other things, the legal requirements that 
apply to the analysis and inspection of business emails. This commentary is followed by 
Dr. Micha-Manuel Bues’ paper, “Compliance Tech,” in which Dr. Bues focuses on the 
use of big data to ensure compliance and conduct internal investigations.  
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Lastly, the organizational sociological perspective of compliance is then featured by Dr. 
Jens Bergmann in his piece entitled “When Compliance Fails”. 
     
 
With our best regards, 
 
 
 
M ichele  DeStefano & Dr.  Hendrik  Schneider  
Founders and Content Curators of CEJ 
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INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AND THE EVOLVING 
FATE OF PRIVILEGE 1  
Lucian E. Dervan 
AUTHOR 
Professor Dervan joined the Southern Illinois University School of Law faculty in 2009 
and focuses his teaching and scholarship on domestic and international criminal law.  He 
is a member of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's Council and 
serves as a member of the Advisory Committee of the NACDL White Collar Criminal 
Defense College at Stetson. Professor Dervan has been invited to speak about criminal law 
before various organizations and bodies, including the United States House of Represent-
atives’ Judiciary Committee, the United States Sentencing Commission, and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Prior to joining the SIU School of 
Law, Professor Dervan served as a law clerk to the Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. He also spent six years in pri-
vate practice with King and Spalding LLP and Ford and Harrison LLP. Professor 
Dervan provides expert testimony and consulting services regarding both domestic and 
international criminal law, including white collar crime, internal corporate investigations 
(both domestic and international), and plea bargaining (individual and corporate). 
ABSTRACT 
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court delivered a landmark ruling in Upjohn Co. v. 
United States.  The decision made clear that the protections afforded by the attorney-
client privilege apply to internal corporate investigations.  This piece examines the fun-
damental tenets of Upjohn, discusses some recent challenges to the applicability of privilege 
to materials gathered during internal investigations, and considers the manner in which 
the international nature of modern internal investigations adds complexity and uncer-
tainty to the field. 
 
			
1
  Thank you to my research assistant, Zachary Lessard, for his assistance with this piece. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  In 1981, the United States Supreme Court was asked to consider the applicability of the 
attorney-client privilege to a corporate internal investigation in the case of Upjohn Co. v. 
United States.2 The case stemmed from an internal investigation into questionable pay-
ments to foreign officials by employees of a pharmaceutical manufacturer.  As part of 
the internal investigation, the corporation distributed a questionnaire to its employees 
seeking relevant information regarding such payments.  The responses were then re-
viewed by the corporation’s General Counsel and outside attorneys.  Eventually, several 
governmental entities became involved in the matter, including the Internal Review 
Service, who was interested in the tax consequences of the payments.  As part of its in-
quiry, the IRS requested copies of the questionnaire responses provided to investigating 
counsel by Upjohn’s employees.  The company refused on the basis of the attorney-
client privilege and the matter was litigated to the Supreme Court.   
 
In reaching its decision in the case, the Supreme Court considered the lower court’s 
assertion that the privilege did not apply “[t]o the extent that the communications were 
made by officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn’s actions in response 
to legal advice . . . for the simple reason that the communications were not the ‘cli-
ent’s.’”3 In the lower court’s opinion, only those in the corporation’s “control group” 
were covered by the privilege.  In considering the matter, the Supreme Court rejected 
the “control group” approach, stating that the test “frustrates the very purpose of the 
privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of 
the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation.”4 In ex-
plaining its decision, the Court reminded the parties of the historical purpose of the 
privilege.  
 
The attorney–client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential com-
munications known to the common law.  Its purpose is to encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.  
The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends 
and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed 
by the client.5   
 
Consistent with the spirit and purpose of this language, the Court concluded that the 			
2
  449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
3
  Id. at 388. 
4
  Id. at 392. 
5
  Id. at 389. 
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questionnaires were covered by the attorney-client privilege.   
 
The Upjohn decision made clear that the protections afforded by the attorney-client 
privilege apply to internal corporate investigations and interactions between investigat-
ing counsel and employees.  Nevertheless, challenges to the applicability of the privilege 
have continued as adversarial parties have sought to gain access to materials from these 
inquiries.  This piece examines three such examples and considers the lessons learned for 
corporations and their counsel in each. 
II. KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT 
 
   One of the most publicized cases regarding internal investigations and privilege in 
recent years is the Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”) matter in the District of Columbia.  
In the KBR case, a whistleblower argued that the corporation had defrauded the gov-
ernment related to military contracts in Iraq.6 During discovery, the whistleblower re-
quested documents regarding a prior internal investigation of the matter conducted by 
in-house counsel at the company. KBR refused, asserting that the investigation had been 
undertaken to obtain legal advice and, therefore, the materials sought were protected 
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.7 In reviewing the matter, the district 
court concluded that the materials were not protected from disclosure because the de-
fendant had not shown that “the communication would not have been made ‘but for’ 
the fact that legal advice was sought.”8 According to the district court, “KBR fail[ed] to 
carry its burden to demonstrate that the attorney-client privilege applies to the COBC 
documents. Most importantly, the Court finds that the COBC investigations were un-
dertaken pursuant to regulatory law and corporate policy rather than for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice.”9 
 
In 2014, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia overturned the 
lower court ruling, concluding that the “same considerations that led the Court in 
Upjohn to uphold the corporation’s privilege claims apply here.”10 In reaching its deci-
sion, the appellate court offered important clarifications regarding the Upjohn decision.  
First, the court made clear that Upjohn “does not hold or imply that the involvement of 			
6
  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. et al., 756 F.3d 754, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  Many of the cases discussed and 
referenced herein also include issues related to the work-product doctrine.  This article, however, will only 
focus on the cases as they related to the attorney-client privilege. 
7
  See id. 
8
  Id. 
9
  United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Company, 37 F.Supp.3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2014). 
10
  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. et al., 756 F.3d at 757. 
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outside counsel is a necessary predicate for the privilege to apply.”11 Second, the court 
explained that “communications made by and to non-attorneys serving as agents of 
attorneys in internal investigations are routinely protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.”12 Third, the court noted that Upjohn does not require a “company to use magic 
words to its employees in order to gain the benefit of the privilege for an internal inves-
tigation.”13  
 
The appellate court in the KBR case also rejected the lower court’s argument that the 
company’s internal investigation did not deserve privilege protection because it was the 
result of regulatory requirements and corporate policies.  The appellate court stated, “So 
long as obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes of the 
internal investigation, the attorney-client privilege applies, even if there were also other 
purposes for the investigation and even if the investigation was mandated by regulation 
rather than simply an exercise of company discretion.”14 As part of this analysis, the 
appellate court rejected the lower court’s use of a “but for” test to determine if a com-
munication was properly protected by the attorney-client privilege.15 
 
[T]he District Court’s novel [“but for”] approach would eradicate the attorney-
client privilege for internal investigations conducted by businesses that are re-
quired by law to maintain compliance programs, which is now the case in a sig-
nificant swath of American industry.  In turn, businesses would be less likely to 
disclosure facts to their attorneys and to seek legal advice, which would “limit the 
valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the 
law.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.16 
 
The appellate court concluded by determining that the district court “clearly erred.”17  
 
Despite the strong language from the appellate court in the KBR case, the plaintiffs in 
the matter continued to challenge the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.18 The 
matter eventually made its way to the United States Supreme Court, which denied the 			
11
  Id at 758. 
12
  Id. 
13
  Id. 
14
  Id. at 758-59.  As part of this analysis, the appellate court also rejected the lower court’s use of a “but for” test 
with regard to the purpose of the communication.  See id. at 759. 
15
  See id. at 759. 
16
  Id. at 759. 
17
  See id. at 760. 
18
  See Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. et al., 2015 WL 4727411 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2015). 
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plaintiff’s writ of certiorari in January 2016.19 The KBR matter is a strong signal that, 
despite Upjohn, investigating counsel must be prepared for potential litigation regarding 
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to internal investigations. To this end, 
counsel must be vigilant in ensuring that the investigation and any subsequent disclo-
sures are made with a full understanding and appreciation of the risks of such challeng-
es. 
 
III. WAL-MART 
 
   Another internal investigation matter that has garnered recent attention is the dispute 
over the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to an internal investigation con-
ducted by Wal-Mart related to alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
The matter began when the New York Times published a story in April 2012 regarding 
potential bribery by employees of Wal-Mart in Mexico.20 The article included allega-
tions that Wal-Mart executives had been aware of the conduct since 2005, and failed to 
adequately respond.21 In particular, the article alleged that Wal-Mart had conducted an 
ineffective internal investigation, allowing the same general counsel of Wal-Mart de 
Mexico who was implicated in the scandal to lead the inquiry.22 In June 2012, the Indi-
ana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW (“IBEW”), a Wal-Mart shareholder, 
contacted the company and requested access to documents related to the company’s 
investigation of the bribery allegations.23 Wal-Mart provided some materials, but de-
clined to provide documents that that they argued were protected by privilege or not 
necessary and essential to the trust fund’s inquiry.24 The issue eventually moved into the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, which ordered Wal-Mart to produce the documents un-
der what is known as the Garner doctrine.25 The matter was then appealed to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, which also focused on the Garner doctrine to determine whether 
the plaintiffs were entitled to the materials.26 			
19
  See United States ex rel. Barko v. Kellogg Brown & Root, et al., U.S., No. 15-589, cert. denied (Jan. 16, 2016). 
20
  See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle, New 
York Times (April 21, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-
mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
21
  See id. 
22
  See id. 
23
  See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW, 95 A.3d 1264, 1268-69 
(Del. 2014) 
24
  See id. at 1269. 
25
  See id. at 1270 (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
26
  See id. 
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The Garner doctrine “allows stockholders of a corporation to invade the corporation’s 
attorney-client privilege in order to prove fiduciary breaches by those in control of the 
corporation upon showing good cause.”27 In determining whether good cause exists, the 
Garner court established a number of factors for consideration.  
 
There are many indicia that may contribute to a decision of presence or absence of good 
cause, among them the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they repre-
sent; the bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders’ claim and 
whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or desirability of the sharehold-
ers having the information and the availability of it from other sources; whether, if the 
shareholders’ claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action criminal, or 
illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality; whether the communication is of advice 
concerning the litigation itself; the extent to which the communication is identified 
versus the extent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of 
trade secrets or other information in whose confidentiality the corporation has an inter-
est for independent reasons.28 
 
In this matter, because the IBEW was a shareholder, much of the contention centered 
on the necessity of breaching the privilege to obtain the information sought.   
 
After reviewing the facts of the case and the Garner doctrine, the Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower court decision ordering Wal-Mart to produce the privileged 
materials.29 In reaching its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court noted the importance 
of the attorney-client privilege and stated, “[T]he Garner doctrine fiduciary exception 
to the attorney-client privilege is narrow, exacting, and intended to be very difficult to 
satisfy.”30 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s had satisfied this high bar.  
The conclusion was reached, in part, because the focus of the suit was on the internal 
			
27
  See id. at 1276. 
 The attorney-client privilege still has viability for the corporate client. The corporation is not barred from 
asserting it merely because those demanding information enjoy the status of stockholders. But where the 
corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests, pro-
tection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availability 
of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in 
the particular instance. 
 Id. 
28
  Id. at 1276 n.32 (quoting Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104). 
29
  Id. at 1280. 
30
  Id. at 1278. 
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investigation itself, rather than the underlying bribery.31 This led the court to conclude 
that providing access to the privileged investigatory materials was necessary and essential 
to the IBEW’s claims.  As the lower court stated when considering the matter, “[W]here 
there is a colorable basis that part of the wrongdoing was in the way the investigation 
itself was conducted, I think it’s very difficult to find those documents by other 
means.”32   
 
As shareholder suits related to allegedly improper or inadequate internal investigations 
grow, counsel must be cognizant of the possibility that plaintiffs might attempt to over-
come privilege protections using the Garner doctrine.33 This should serve as a reminder 
to corporations of the importance of engaging independent outside counsel to conduct 
thorough and credible investigations when potential serious misconduct is discovered.34 
If the Wal-Mart investigation itself had not been at issue here, it is probable that the 
Garner exception to the privilege protection might not have been invoked and the mate-
rials might have remained protected from compelled disclosure.  
 
IV. BANK OF CHINA 
 
   The above cases demonstrate the increasing frequency with which challenges are being 
brought regarding the application of privilege to internal investigation materials. While 
the above cases center on the application of United States privilege law, the growing 
international nature of internal investigations means that foreign privilege laws are also 
of vital importance.  As noted in my 2011 article, International White Collar Crime and 
the Globalization of Internal Investigations, understanding how privilege laws vary by 
jurisdiction is imperative for investigating counsel.35 
 			
31
  See Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 95 A.3d at 1278 (“The record reflects that IBEW’s proper purposes sought infor-
mation regarding the handling of the WalMex Investigation, whether a cover-up took place, and what details 
were shared with the Wal-Mart Board.  The Court of Chancery explained that the documents IBEW sought 
under Garner ‘go to those issues.’”). 
32
  Id. at 1279.  
33
  See e.g. In re Lululemon Athletica Inc., 220 Litigation, C.A. No. 9039-VCP (April 30, 2015) (in which the 
Delaware Court of Chancery ordered the company to produce certain privileged documents to plaintiffs re-
lated to an investigation of potential insider trading). 
34
  See Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of Internal Investigations, 39 
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 361 (2012); Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct in the Age of 
the Whistleblower: Foreseeing and Avoiding Hidden Dangers, 3 BLOOMBERG CORPORATE LAW JOURNAL 
670 (2008). 
35
  Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of Internal Investigations, 39 
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 361 (2012). 
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[O]ne must be familiar with privilege laws in the jurisdictions, both regional and 
national, involved in an international internal investigation as the rules vary dra-
matically by country and subject matter.  While the different variations of privi-
lege can have a myriad of impacts on an internal inquiry, two will be mentioned 
here specifically.  First, the role of inhouse counsel, including a corporation’s gen-
eral counsel, must be closely examined.  While it is common for in-house counsel 
in the United States to perform a preliminary inquiry to determine whether out-
side counsel is required for a more extensive investigation, in some jurisdictions 
the materials and information collected during this initial appraisal of the situa-
tion might not be protected from compulsory disclosure. . . Second, counsel must 
be aware of the possibility that attorneys from one region of the globe might not 
enjoy any privilege protections in certain jurisdictions, even if they are independ-
ent outside counsel. . . While grappling with the difficulties presented by these 
divergent privilege rules is challenging, conducting an international internal in-
vestigation without consideration of their impact on the course and conduct of 
the inquiry could be fatal.36 
 
The potential ramifications for the existence of varying approaches to the attorney-
client privilege around the world is well illustrated by the Bank of China case.37  
 
The Bank of China case stems from the death of Daniel Wultz and the injuries suffered 
by Yekutiel Wultz in a 2006 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, Israel.38 The attack was carried 
out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), an organization designated a terrorist group 
subject to economic sanctions.39 In response, the Wultz family filed suit against the bank 
and others in federal court in the United States, alleging, among other things, that the 
bank had provided material support to the PLI in violation of United States law.  Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, the Bank of China failed to comply with the economic sanc-
tions against the PIJ and facilitated wire transfers for the organization that “were in-
strumental in helping the PIJ to plan and execute terrorist attacks.”40 During discovery 
in the matter, the plaintiffs sought documents from the Bank of China, including mate-
rials located in China and related to “anti-money laundering (“AML”) and compliance 
procedures and investigations.”41 The bank, however, refused to provide certain materi-
als, alleging they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.  In 			
36
  Id. at 372-73. 
37
  See Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 304 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Wultz v. Bank of China ltd., 979 F. Supp. 
2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
38
  See Wultz, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 483. 
39
  See Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 2d 841, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
40
  Id. 
41
  Wultz, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
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response, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel.  
In addressing the dispute, the court first determined which privilege law was applicable 
in the matter.  This was of vital significant because of distinctions between the privilege 
laws of the United States and China.  After examining choice of law precedent, the court 
concluded that some documents were government by Chinese law and others were gov-
erned by American law.42 With regard to the documents governed by Chinese law, the 
court quickly disposed of the issue by noting that Chinese law does not recognize the 
attorney-client privilege.43 As a result, the court ordered the bank to produce those ma-
terials government by Chinese law and dated prior to receipt of the plaintiff’s demand 
letter on January 28, 2008, which date marked the beginning of litigation in the case.44 
With regard to the documents government by American law, the court focused on 
whether the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege should be extended to 
communications between employees of the company and members of the company’s 
Legal and Compliance Department in China. The plaintiffs argued that the company’s 
in-house counsel in China were “not required to have legal degrees or bar certificates” 
and, therefore, communications with them were not entitled to protection by the attor-
ney-client privilege.45 The Bank of China responded by arguing that the Chinese in-
house counsel were the “functional equivalent” of attorneys and were permitted to offer 
legal advice.46 The court agreed with the plaintiffs and concluded that the bank had 
failed to establish that the communications satisfied the requirements of the attorney-
client privilege.47 
 
The United Shoe principle justifies the protection of the attorney-client privilege 
for circumstances where a lawyer—whose authority derives from her position as a 			
42
  See id. at 489-92.  The court utilized a “touch base” analysis in determining which country’s privilege laws 
should apply.  This analysis asks which country “has the ‘predominant’ or ‘the most direct and compelling 
interest’ in whether those communications should remain confidential, unless that foreign law is contrary to 
the public policy of this forum.”  Id. at 486. 
43
  See id. at 492-93 (“BOC does not seriously contest the proposition that Chinese law does not include the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine as understood in American law.”). 
44
  See id. at 492 (“U.S. privilege law applies to all documents created after January 28, 2008 that do in fact relate 
to the demand letter and the subject matter that gave rise to this lawsuit, because those documents pertain to 
American law “or the conduct of litigation in the United States.”). 
45
  Id. at 493. 
46
  See id. 
47
  See id. 
 Defendant has failed to carry its burden of establishing that the documents contain “communications (1) 
between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) 
for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance, or attorneys' mental impressions, opinions or 
legal theories concerning specific litigation.” 
 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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member of the bar—is engaged to provide legal advice. While the Chinese legal 
system may be developing, the distinctions between lawyer and in-house counsel 
are clear and presumably exist for a good reason. I see no compelling reason to 
depart from the long-standing principle of United Shoe and create a “functional 
equivalency” test for the invocation of the attorney-client privilege when apply-
ing United States law. To the extent BOC has claimed privilege over communica-
tions from, to and among members of legal or other departments who are not li-
censed attorneys, the attorney-client privilege does not apply.48 
 
In concluding its discussion of the privilege issue, the court reminded the parties of the 
fundamental rule that “[p]rivilege does not apply to ‘an internal corporate investigation 
. . . made by management itself.’”49  
 
The Bank of China case is an important example of the complexities and potential pit-
falls that can result from the international and cross-border nature of modern internal 
corporate investigations.  The decision of the court in the Bank of China case to compel 
the disclosure of materials from the investigation makes clear that counsel must consider 
and react to varying global standards regarding the applicability of privilege when struc-
turing and conducting an investigation.  This includes understanding that privilege laws 
in foreign jurisdictions may determine the outcome of discovery disputes in not only 
foreign venues, but also in United States courts.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
   In 1981, the United States Supreme Court made clear in Upjohn that the protections 
afforded by the attorney-client privilege apply to internal corporate investigations.  Nev-
ertheless, the application of such privilege protections remains an evolving field as new 
challenges are brought and new complexities are introduced. As investigating counsel 
continue engaging in these matters, it remains vital that privilege considerations and 
changes in this area of law remain at the forefront of their minds as they both structure 
and conduct inquiries.   
 
			
48
  Id. at 495.  The quote refers to United States v. Shoe, 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.C. Mass. 1950). 
49
  Id. at 496; see also Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of Internal 
Investigations, 39 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 361, 367-73 (2012) (discussing the importance of using 
legal counsel when conducting internal investigations). 
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   The settings and circumstances of internal investigations are as manifold as life itself. 
They are conducted according to the usual customs of the company and the legal tradi-
tion in its jurisdiction. Internal investigations differ depending on their scope and goals. 
A compliance audit examining whether local management adhered to internal rules and 
regulations and compliance processes is conducted differently compared to an investiga-
tion following a whistle-blower report. Internal investigations conducted in parallel 
with criminal investigations or those of supervisory authorities or aimed at supporting 
these investigations often follow other rules. Just as the particular circumstances of in-
ternal investigations can differ considerably, the legal issues raised by them can be equal-
ly varied and complex, in particular in group-wide cross-border investigations. All af-
fected companies and corporate bodies, holding companies and affiliates or even differ-
ent departments within one company, the management and supervisory boards of the 
companies, their shareholders, employees, business partners and other external players 
often have varied and conflicting interests which sometimes cannot easily be resolved 
and many of which are protected by applicable local laws. 
 
In the following I would like to address some typical areas in international internal in-
vestigations in which legal conflicts exist between holding companies and affiliates or 
within participating entities and functions: Some of these are often overlooked when 
defining the scope or methods of an internal investigation and its legal limits.   
I. CONFIDENTIALITY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
   Privacy and data protection issues are of major concern in any kind of compliance 
review, compliance audit and in particular in international internal investigations.1 Data 
might be transferred from one corporate body (affiliate) to another (holding company) 
and/or to different jurisdictions. Even regular or random controls by the internal audit 
or compliance department of the holding company can trigger similar complex privacy 
issues which need legal assessment under all applicable laws in all affected jurisdictions. 
Even if awareness of these issues exists within a group of companies, it often first has to 
be raised at foreign law enforcement agencies.2 Privacy issues can require the company to 
delete any reference to or redact personal data, in particular names, or other information 
which easily allows the identification of an individual.3 This can make it impossible to 			
1
  Tim Wybitul, chapter II note I, in Internal Investigations (Thomas C. Knierim et al eds., 2012); Thomas C. 
Knierim, chapter 5 note 140, in Handbuch des Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrechts (Heinz-Bernd Wabnitz & 
Thomas Janovsky, 4th ed. 2006). 
2
  Ralf Deutlmoser & Alexander Filip, European Data Privacy versus U.S. (e-)Discovery Obligations - A Practi-
cal Guide For Enterprises, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DATENSCHUTZ (ZD) (6/2012). 
3
  Tim Wybitul, Interne Ermittlungen auf Aufforderung von US-Behörden – ein Erfahrungsbericht, BETRIEBS- 
BERATER (BB) 606, 610 (12.2009); Stephan Spehl & Thomas Grützner, § 6 (Germany), in Corporate Internal 
Investigations note 159 (Spehl/Grützner, 2013). 
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provide documents or emails without redacting parts of them and requires the de-
personalisation of investigation reports. 
 
Apart from privacy laws, it is not always the case that the internal audit or compliance 
department or an external law firm or auditing firm which has been instructed to con-
duct an internal investigation can access information and data in possession of a compa-
ny which has not requested the audit. In almost all jurisdictions, the management of a 
company is duty-bound to protect its trade and business secrets. This is one of the duties 
of managers and employees arising from their employment contracts, the company’s 
articles of association, or statutory civil or criminal law provisions. This covers, amongst 
other things, details on contractual relations with customers and vendors, how a con-
tract was acquired, how the company has interacted with competitors and similar mat-
ters. Whether or not or to what extent a trade or business secret can be disclosed to other 
parties, even if they belong to the same group of companies, must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The laws of more than one jurisdiction may apply if the secrets of a 
company are available in branch offices or shared service centres situated in various 
countries. 
 
A secret can be disclosed if the party whose interest is to be protected by the confidenti-
ality obligation consents thereto. Whether the consent of the management is sufficient 
or whether the consent of the supervisory board or the shareholders is also required, 
must be determined on the basis of applicable national law. The same applies to the 
question of which requirements relating to form and other prerequisites must be met. 
 
Confidentiality clauses in contracts can oblige a contractual party to keep all infor-
mation related to that contract confidential even with respect to holding companies. 
Controls by holding companies or vague compliance requirements do not nullify such 
confidentiality obligations. Although the holding company may feel that it has a legiti-
mate interest in obtaining such information, the affiliate’s obligation under applicable 
law may be different. Non-compliance with contractual confidentiality obligations 
normally results in a breach of contract and places the breaching party at risk of the oth-
er contractual party asserting its right to obtain a remedy, in particular to termination 
and/or damages. Additionally, it must be taken into account that results obtained in an 
internal investigation by violation of such confidentiality obligations may not be used 
against the other contractual party. 
In certain cases, the breach of confidentiality obligations can also constitute a criminal 
offence. If the offence is designed to protect business secrets of the company from un-
lawful disclosure by management or employees, the consent of the competent body of 
the company will eliminate criminal risk. However, if the contractual party is a govern-
mental or semi-governmental entity or company, statutory confidentiality regulations in 
that party’s jurisdiction may apply. This may in particular apply if business or contracts 
with national security authorities, secret services or their procurement entities are con-
cerned. Applicable law may provide that even the granting of access to employees of a 
contractual party requires prior notification and/or the consent of the other contractual 
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party, and even more if access is to be granted to employees of outside parties. A viola-
tion of these statutory confidentiality rules may entail criminal law risks. Both the 
breaching party, its directors or officers as well as all individuals who were unlawfully 
given access to the information may be at risk of having committed espionage or related 
crimes. The result in such cases can be, for example, that a document or email search in 
an internal investigation on alleged bribery requires the prior consent of the bribed par-
ty. Similarly, Articles 271 and 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code prohibit the gathering of 
evidence or collection of business secrets which will or might be used in proceedings or 
litigation in foreign countries and, thus, limits the potential use of information gathered 
or revealed in the course of internal investigations on Swiss soil.4 
II. IN-HOUSE LEGAL PRIVILEGE 
 
Legal privilege issues are usually discussed with respect to the protection of privileged 
information from disclosure to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. Similar prob-
lems arise in internal investigation situations with respect to the disclosure of infor-
mation to the compliance department or the internal investigators, at least for those 
jurisdictions which acknowledge legal privilege with respect to advice given by in-house 
counsel.5 Depending on whether legal privilege is a right of members of the legal profes-
sion, as in the Netherlands, or a right of the client, the client’s consent to disclosure to 
the internal investigators may be required. This leads to the question of who the client 
is, irrespective of whether advice was given by in-house counsel or external counsel. The 
company or also the manager concerned? 
 
Example:  
The managing director of a Romanian affiliate of a Japanese company approaches the 
regional legal department on what steps he, as a managing director, must take after be-
coming aware of rumours that the sales department may have used a dubious consultant 
for the acquisition of a contract. 
 
In such contexts it cannot easily be said that the managing director did not act in a per-
sonal capacity, but as a function holder of the affiliate. In many situations it is difficult 
to determine whether the instructions were (solely) aimed at obtaining advice on what 
the legal obligations of the company are, but (additionally) what he in his capacity as 			
4
  Mark Livschitz, § 12 (Switzerland), in Corporate Internal Investigations note 21 et seq (Spehl/Gruetzner, 
2013). 
5
  Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, The production of documents in international arbitration - a commentary on 
article 3 of the new IBA Rules of Evidence, ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 411 (2002); Gabrielle Kauf-
mann-Kohler & Antonio Bärtsch, Discovery in international arbitration: How much is too much? ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR SCHIEDSVERFAHREN (SCHIEDSVZ) 13, 19 f. (2004). 
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function holder is required to do. The answer to this question determines whether ac-
cess to that information requires the consent of the manager concerned as well. This 
could be difficult if he or she is or may become a suspect in the investigation or has al-
ready left or been dismissed from the company. Similar questions arise regarding the 
scope of protected information, in particular if the consent of employees providing 
information to in-house counsel for giving advice to the client is also required. 
III. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
 
In many cases, the results of the internal investigations will be used to meet mandatory 
requirements under applicable law, to immediately stop any illegal activities, to attempt 
remediation if deficiencies or weaknesses in processes and controls are discovered or to 
take appropriate employment measures up to the dismissal of the individuals involved. 
Companies usually have broad discretion to disclose the findings of internal investiga-
tions to law enforcement agencies. This depends mostly on the corporate culture of the 
company, legal traditions in the jurisdictions affected and whether a zero tolerance poli-
cy is interpreted in such a way that all violations of criminal law or particular violations 
will be disclosed to prosecutors or other law enforcement agencies. 
 
Certain jurisdictions do have leniency programmes principal witness arrangements) in 
place or provide for principal witness arrangements (like Section 209b Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure) if an offence is disclosed voluntarily or the disclosing party is the 
first to inform law enforcement agencies about criminal conduct and makes a significant 
contribution to the full disclosure and investigation of the notified conduct. Such leni-
ency programmes can lead to a reduction in fines. For example, Article 16 of the Brazili-
an Law 12,846 (Clean Companies Act) establishes that upon participation in a leniency 
programme, corporate fines will be reduced by two-thirds. Other jurisdictions provide 
for exemption from criminal prosecution, e.g. Articles 290 (3) and 292 (2) of the Crimi-
nal Code of Romania or Sections 371, 398a and 378 (3) of the Fiscal Code of Germany. 
Companies have wide discretion on whether to make use of these leniency possibilities 
or to refrain from doing so.6 In many jurisdictions there is a lack of experience regarding 
whether these provisions have been applied at all or how they will be applied in practice. 
 
In other jurisdictions there are compulsory notification requirements, either in general 
or in particular situations. Most jurisdictions provide for mandatory notification of 
certain forthcoming infringements of law, mainly serious offences. Some of them are 
connected to health and safety violations, violations of technical safety requirements or 			
6
  Gerald Spindler, AktG, section 93, in Münchener Kommentar note 54 (Wulf Goette et al eds., 3rd ed. 2008); 
Christian Pelz, Offenbarungs- und Meldepflichten bei Internal Investigations, in Festschrift für Jürgen Wes-
sing 614 (Heiko Ahlbrecht et al eds., 1st ed. 2016). 
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environmental hazards. For example, this applies to Chapter 15 Section 10 of the Finnish 
Criminal Code. Disclosure requirements may result if the internal investigation reveals 
that unsafe or dangerous products have been distributed or sold which may require a 
product warning or a recall. 
 
Certain jurisdictions also impose an obligation to notify law enforcement agencies of 
criminal conduct committed in the past. For example, Article 108 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code of the People’s Republic of China obliges every organisation and individu-
al to notify law enforcement agencies if a crime is suspected. Comparably, under Arti-
cle 77 of the Law 906/2004 of Columbia, anyone who has knowledge of a past offence 
must file a notification. In both countries, the duty to inform law enforcement agencies 
is a general civic duty. A violation of such duty does not, however, incur criminal liabil-
ity. 
 
The duty of legality is a major pillar of all compliance systems worldwide, requiring the 
company, its managers and employees to abide by the rules of law, at home and abroad. 
In particular, managers can become liable for damages if they do not ensure that the 
company complies with all applicable domestic and foreign law.7 Taking compliance 
seriously and in a strict dogmatic manner, the company has to notify the law enforce-
ment agencies of such criminal conduct; otherwise it will be difficult to explain to their 
employees that the company expects full compliance with the law from its employees, 
but itself supports cherry-picking and decides on a case-by-case basis whether it is ap-
propriate to meet legal requirements. 
 
It can be argued that non-compliance with these laws does not impose a legal risk on the 
company and flouting the law may only cause reputational but not financial harm. Alt-
hough this is true from a commercial perspective, such convenient decisions undermine 
the acceptance and notion of compliance as a whole. 
 
It becomes much more difficult to resolve these conflicts if non-compliance can be en-
forced by sanctions. Sometimes sanctions are minimal, such as those in Art. 274 Crimi-
nal Code of the United Arab Emirates, under which non-notification of a crime can be 
penalised with a fine of up to 1,000 dirhams (equivalent to approximately EUR 240 or 
USD 250). From a financial perspective there will be room to weigh up the commercial 
interests of the company with the consequences of non-compliance. However, other 
jurisdictions provide for severe criminal sanctions including imprisonment for violation 
of notification requirements. For example Sec. 316 (1) Crime Act 1900 of New South 
Wales, Sec. 34 Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act of South Africa or 			
7
  Regional Court Munich 10.12.2013 - 5 HK O 1387/10, NZWiSt 2013, 183, 187; Christian Pelz, We observe local 
law – Strafrechtskonflikte in internationalen Compliance-Programmen, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT (CCZ) 234, 237 (2013). 
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Art. 441 of Law 599/2000 of Colombia provide for fines and/or imprisonment if past 
criminal conduct is not disclosed to the relevant law enforcement agencies. Whilst these 
criminal law provisions require both intent and proof that a crime was committed, in-
ternal investigations often cannot furnish full proof of a criminal offence but only a 
more or less high degree of suspicion, so that – from a pragmatic perspective – there may 
be some room left for argumentation. However, the law can be different in other juris-
dictions. Article 368 of the Czech Criminal Code or Article 340 of the Criminal Code of 
Slovakia, for example, provide that each individual is obliged to notify law enforcement 
agencies about the mere suspicion of certain criminal conduct, such as bribery offences. 
Such obligation is imposed on any person within the reach of the applicable law. In 
jurisdictions which acknowledge criminal liability of companies, the obligation is im-
posed on companies as well. In addition to this, each natural person within the scope of 
application of that law is obliged to meet the notification requirements. This may apply 
to board members of the relevant company, future board members, or every employee 
residing in the territory where the relevant act took place who learns about such suspi-
cion. Notwithstanding this, the internal investigators, once they learn or have 
knowledge of such suspicion and are residing in the territory of such jurisdiction, even 
temporarily, are also required to make such notification. 
 
If lawyers or accountants act as internal investigators, conflicts between such notifica-
tion requirements and the obligation to protect attorney-client privilege may result. 
Whilst most countries acknowledge attorney-client privilege, it needs to be determined 
whether such privilege applies only to attorneys and accountants admitted to the local 
bar or if it is also granted to foreign lawyers and accountants. In most jurisdictions, at-
torneys and accountants admitted in one EU Member State can request admission in 
another Member State for certain activities or proceedings and then enjoy the same pro-
tection as local attorneys. However, this may not apply to internal investigations, but 
only to legal proceedings. Further, it is questionable whether suspicion obtained by 
investigating books and records of a company is protected by attorney-client privilege, in 
particular if the lawyer or accountant has not received such information from or on 
behalf of their client. 
 
This problem becomes more complex if the violation of professional secrecy obligations 
also constitutes a criminal offence under the laws of the country in which the internals 
investigator are admitted or practise. The professionals concerned then have a problem: 
they will be criminally liable under the laws of the country in which they were admitted 
to practise if they disclose information or would do so under the laws of where the in-
vestigation is taking place if they refrain from disclosing it. The only option this leaves 
these professionals is to decide which offence they would prefer to commit. It might be 
a defence argument that a person cannot be held criminally liable if either reaction 
would lead to the violation of criminal law. Whether or not such a defence would be 
acknowledged is a question of applicable national jurisdiction. There are virtually no 
court precedents and uncertainty will therefore remain. It would be unjust to rule out 
this defence due to the fact that professionals in an internal investigation voluntarily put 
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themselves in a situation in which they had to notify the authorities and that by accept-
ing such a mandate remit, the notification requirement prevails. Investigators who are 
not bound by professional secrecy cannot even rely on this defence but have no other 
option from a legal point of view but to meet the disclosure requirements.  
 
In my experience, internal investigators in such situations will most likely refrain from 
complying with the notification requirement and accept that they will commit a crimi-
nal offence (provided they even know about their notification requirements). This is 
driven by a pragmatic approach: The internal investigators will most likely be admitted 
and practise in a foreign jurisdiction and will only be temporarily subject to the scope of 
application of these criminal law provisions on notification for a considerably short 
period of time, thus considerably reducing the actual risk of prosecution. 
IV. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE OF INVESTIGATORS 
 
Usually when conducting an internal investigation, companies try to protect attorney-
client privilege and attorney-work privilege as best as possible. In international internal 
investigations it is a must to determine the prerequisites and scope of attorney-client 
privilege in all affected jurisdictions before starting work. One must not forget to ana-
lyse this question from all aspects. Whilst information gathered by the internal investi-
gator usually falls within the scope of attorney-client privilege, it must be assessed in 
which direction the scope provides protection. Usually, only the client is protected by 
the privilege which leads to the next question of who the client is. Accepting multiple 
instructions from more than one company of a group of companies is risky since each 
client might waive privilege separately so that remaining clients might no longer be pro-
tected against disclosure of information which is not only theirs. Often it will be diffi-
cult to determine who the owner of a secret is so that, in cases of doubt, the consent of 
all owners may be required. Further, if members of the compliance or internal audit 
department form part of the investigation team, knowledge which they obtain during 
the internal investigation is not protected since they are not acting in the capacity of 
attorneys or accountants, but within the scope of their usual work duties. To obtain full 
protection they may not form part of the investigation team and not obtain additional 
knowledge which they do not already have. 
 
In international investigations it always is necessary to obtain local counsel for the as-
sessment of factual questions or legal analysis. The scope of attorney-client privilege of 
local counsel is determined by applicable local law. In certain jurisdictions, China for 
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example, attorney-client privilege does not explicitly exist at all8 or the scope of such 
privilege is extremely unclear. Other jurisdictions provide for attorney-client privilege 
only for certain members of the legal profession. In the Ukraine, for example, attorneys 
working for foreign law firms, rather than Ukrainian law firms, are exempt from the 
privilege of professional secrecy. In Russia, for example, only trial attorneys admitted as 
“advocats”, are protected by professional secrecy9 whilst client-attorney communication 
with regular attorneys is not protected at all. This must be taken into account when 
defining the scope of work of local counsel because even within one law firm, commu-
nication with one attorney may be privileged whilst it is not with another. 
V. MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
Anti-money laundering legislation in many jurisdictions requires obliged entities and 
natural persons to report suspicious transactions. Article 23 (2) of the Third Anti-
Money Laundering Directive10 and Article 34 (2) of the upcoming Fourth EU Anti-
Money Laundering Directive11, which must be transposed into the law of the Member 
States no later than 26 June 2017, provides that members of the legal profession and 
auditors may not disclose such information which they receive from, or obtain on, one 
of their clients, in the course of ascertaining the legal position of their client, or perform-
ing their task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning, judicial proceed-
ings, including providing advice on instituting or avoiding such proceedings, whether 
such information is received or obtained before, during or after such proceedings. Oth-
erwise, pursuant to Art. 22 (1) (a) of the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive, re-
porting obligations exist if the obliged entity knows or has reasonable grounds to sus-
pect that money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or 
attempted. 
 
The reporting obligation applies not only to present and future financial transactions, 
but it also encompasses cases in which the obliged entity subsequently obtains 
knowledge of facts indicating that a transaction was or could have been related to money 
laundering. Whilst members of the legal profession and accountants are exempted from 
the reporting obligation due to the fact that conducting an internal investigation will be 
regarded as “ascertaining the legal position for their client”, reporting obligations con-
tinue to apply to other persons. This may lead to the result that the investigated compa-			
8
  Michelle Gon & Ping Zheng, § 3 (China), in Corporate Internal Investigations, note 68 (Spehl/Gruetzner 
2013); Benjamin Miao/Peter Yuen/Melody Wang, chapter 7 (China), in The International Investigations Re-
view, 104 (Nicolas Bourtin, 3rd ed. 2013). 
9
  Ekaterina Kobrin, § 10 (Russia), in Corporate Internal Investigations, note 111 (Spehl/Gruetzner 2013). 
10
  Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005, Official Journal L 309/15. 
11
  Directive (EU) 2014/849 of 20 May 2015, Official Journal L 141/73. 
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ny or people participating in the investigation team without being a member of the legal 
profession are obliged to file a suspicious transaction report to the competent FIU. Ap-
plicable national law determines the details of the reporting obligation, in particular 
whether a strong suspicion of money laundering is required or a vague suspicion is suffi-
cient. 
 
Apart from submitting a suspicious transaction report, it must also be determined 
whether and to what extent criminal activity for the benefit of a corporate body or ac-
cording to which a corporate body is enriched will taint assets of such company. 
 
Example:   
The Romanian entity R of a Japanese holding company obtained contracts with customer 
C by corrupt means. C pays the purchase price of €1 million to the accounts of R, which 
then show a balance of €6 million. 
 
Will all payments received by R from C be regarded as the proceeds of a crime? Will a 
dividend payment of R to the holding company be made with tainted assets? Will the 
shares in the affiliate be regarded as the proceeds of a crime? 
 
If assets are tainted, it must be determined whether this will lead to a contamination of 
the assets in full or only in part. In our example, will the transfer of the purchase price 
taint the whole bank account of C or just the relevant portion?12 In the latter case, if C 
makes a payment of €2 million, will the whole sum be regarded as partially tainted or 
will it be considered untainted as long as the amount remaining in the bank account is 
higher than the funds of criminal origin? The answer to these questions will vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Depending on the answers to these questions, it must be 
determined whether each and every transfer and re-transfer will be considered money 
laundering and whether remedies exist (and if so, which ones) to avoid the contamina-
tion of subsequent transactions. 
VI. AMBIGUITY IN COMPANY INTEREST 
 
Whether an internal investigation is conducted and how to respond to investigation 
results are always important decisions. It is unanimously agreed that to immediately 
stop any illegal activity and to ensure adherence to law in the future is of utmost im-
portance. A differentiated approach is necessary when determining whether prosecutors 
and law enforcement agencies should be contacted. If self-reporting leads to immunity 			
12
  The German Federal Supreme Court in its decision of 20.05.2015 - 1 StR 33/15, NJW 2015, 3254 held that a 
“considerable portion” of illegal funds will taint the whole account. The court did not elaborate on what 
“considerable” exactly means but states that a portion of more than 5.9 % is considerable. 
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from prosecution or sanctions, the decision would appear relatively easy. However, it 
has to be taken into account that in many cases immunity from prosecution only means 
that the company cannot be fined. Damage claims against the company from customers 
or third parties will still be possible. The same might apply to disgorgement of profits. If 
self-reporting only leads to a reduction in fines it must carefully be determined whether 
such voluntary disclosure will pay off. In many cases this is difficult to decide. It might 
be the case that the costs of the investigation are much higher than the expected reduc-
tion of fines. A different approach might be necessary in countries like the US, which 
has a tendency to impose excessive fines. These risks as well as reputational risks, the 
likelihood of being otherwise disclosed or the time period until the matter becomes 
statute-barred have to be assessed. In international cases, limitation periods in many 
countries are much longer than in others. There is also a risk of double punishment in 
two jurisdictions. Under Section 54 Schengen Convention the ne bis in idem principle 
applies only between EU Member States.13 Even then, risks remain. It is first necessary 
for the other EU Member State to acknowledge this principle in the same way the other 
does. Secondly, protection can only be obtained for the same criminal conduct. This 
does not apply if one country does not prosecute due to limitation reasons or for of-
fences which exist only in one jurisdiction but not in the other. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Conducting an internal investigation always requires a careful and thorough assessment 
of all legal consequences which may arise from the findings. This in turn requires the 
investigator to analyse possible investigation results in all directions beforehand. Some-
times conflicts between jurisdictions cannot be completely avoided, but in many cases 
their consequences can. Proactive considerations at the beginning of an investigation are 
an asset which cannot be appreciated highly enough. It should be the task of the compli-
ance organisation of a company to make itself familiar with potential consequences of 
legal hazards. Most will not do so. The experienced investigator should bear these issues 
in mind. 
 
			
13
  Karsten Gaede, Transnationales „ne bis in idem“ auf schwachem grundrechtlichen Fundament, 41 NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT (NJW) 2990 (2014); Wolfgang Schomburg & Irene Suominen-Picht, 
Verbot der mehrfachen Strafverfolgung, Kompetenzkonflikte und Verfahrenstransfer, 17 NJW 1190 (2012). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Over the last decade, it has become more and more common for companies in Germa-
ny to internally investigate any detected or alleged cases of misconduct of their employ-
ees. In fact, investigating compliance violations within the company, especially potential 
criminal offenses, bringing them to an end and sanctioning those who committed them 
are the three main duties of the company’s management with regard to “reactive” or 
“repressive” compliance. In some cases, an internal investigation is conducted parallel to 
pending criminal proceedings and sometimes, due to the misconduct of single employ-
ees, sanctions against the company and its management can be impending. The internal 
investigation then also becomes a means of defense. Obviously, such internal investiga-
tions are especially difficult as the collected evidence might at the same time have nega-
tive implications for the outcome of the criminal proceedings. The following article 
analyzes the challenges that companies face in conducting an internal investigation and 
collecting evidence parallel to ongoing criminal proceedings.   
 
A. What are internal investigations? 
 
The management’s duty to investigate all cases of suspected misconduct is widely ac-
cepted and deprives from corporate1 as well as administrative law regulations2. If the 
management of a company fails to investigate reliable information on potential miscon-
duct it receives and does not stop and avenge any such detected behavior, it can become 
liable to the company for damages occurring from that misconduct. In the “Neubürger” 
decision, the District Court (Landgericht) of München I has explicitly defined the man-
agement‘s omission to take appropriate measures to investigate cases of misconduct 
about which it had been informed as a breach of its duty to implement and monitor an 
effective compliance management system.3 
 
As there is a duty to investigate, this also means that a company is allowed to investigate 
on its own if suspicions of misconduct occur. Thus, it is not limited to rely on possible 
state investigations. In fact, both might take place parallel to each other.4  
 			
1  E.g. Section 93 Paragraph 1 1st sentence and Section 116 of the Stock Corporation Act and Section 43 Para-
graph 1 of the Law on Limited Liability Companies.  
2  In particular Section 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offenses.  
3  See LG München I, Urteil vom 10.12.2013 – 5 HK O 1387/10 = NDCOMPLIANCE 22101 (2014), Paragraph I 
2 (a) of the grounds. 
4  Florian Wettner & Marius Mann, Informationsrecht und Informationspflichten bei Internen Untersuchun-
gen, DEUTSCHES STEUERRECHT 655, 656 (2014). 
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The aim of an internal investigation usually is to gather information about any alleged 
facts, in order to evaluate whether any misconduct exists and in case of affirmation, who 
has done what, when, how and why. The company therefore may perform a number of 
investigative actions such as reviewing data and documents as well as interviewing em-
ployees. The results, usually summed up in an investigation report, form the basis for 
the evaluation of the risks at which the misconduct might put the company and for the 
decision about the next steps to be taken by the management.  
 
While the term “internal investigation” has been common in other legal systems for 
decades, in Germany its occurrence has only risen over the last ten years. Furthermore, 
there is no codified special law with regard to the conduct of an internal investigation. 
The limits for any investigative action are hence the regulations of the applicable sub-
stantive civil and criminal law. In practice, a number of legal questions regarding the 
conduct but also the relation between private and state investigations remain yet open. 
 
B. In what constellations are they conducted? 
 
The initiation of an internal investigation often depends on the time when the alleged 
misconduct gets to the management’s attention and whether any third party, especially a 
prosecution authority, has knowledge of the suspicions in question. 
 
Sometimes an internal investigation is merely conducted because of an internal hint or 
an irregularity detected in an internal audit, without any external knowledge of the facts 
to be investigated at all. In these cases, there is usually no external pressure on the con-
duct of the internal investigation. Thus, it is to some extent at the discretion of the 
company if an external criminal proceeding is performed. Only if the company decides 
to actively involve the authorities, the authorities will evaluate whether an initial suspi-
cion is constituted.  
 
However, this condition changes as soon as there is a risk that the internal information 
will become public. That might be the case e.g. if there is a whistleblower who announc-
es to give his information to the prosecution authorities or if an external audit, e.g. by 
the fiscal authorities, is about to take place. Finally, in other cases, state proceedings are 
already going on. Less critical constellations among them are those in which the person 
or whistleblower that has reported an offense to the prosecution authorities informs the 
company about the proceedings at the same time. That might be the case e.g. when the 
criminal proceedings are initiated parallel or prior to a pending civil law suit. Sometimes 
the company is also informed by reports in the media or can conclude that proceedings 
are ongoing or expectable, because it gets to know that a competitor is already under 
investigation. Again, in these cases the company has the chance to proactively contact 
the prosecution authorities before any compulsory measures are undertaken, and offer 
to cooperate and investigate the allegations internally.  
 
Depending on the case and the expected involvement of the management and the com-
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pany itself, the prosecution authorities might sometimes also contact the company in 
advance with regard to ongoing proceedings against one of its employees.  
 
The most unappreciative cases, however, are usually those in which the proceedings are 
disclosed by compulsory measures against the company, in particular by a search. In 
these cases, the company’s leeway in decision making is much narrower and cooperating 
with the prosecution authorities often becomes inevitable. Additionally, the company 
does not have the knowledge advantage it has when it is the first to become aware of the 
suspicions, but instead has to catch up with what the accusations are and what the pros-
ecution authorities know or presume to know. 
 
C. What are the typical accusations that are investigated? 
 
There are basically two main categories of accusations that can be differentiated. 
 
First, there are cases, in which the company is supposed to be a victim, i.e. has been be-
trayed by its employee without benefiting from the employee’s actions. Examples are 
that an employee has accepted bribes from a supplier to contract with him although the 
products are of minor quality in comparison to those of other competitors or that an 
employee has committed fraudulent actions and transferred company funds to his pri-
vate accounts. 
 
The second category comprises constellations, in which the company might or does 
benefit from its employee’s misconduct. Typical offenses are such that are committed in 
the assumed interest of the company, such as active bribery, often by using slush funds, 
tax evasions or fraud against a third party. In practice, those constellations are highly 
relevant in which these offenses were enabled by a violation of organizational or supervi-
sory duties by a company’s executive (Section 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offenses). 
 
D. How is the company involved in the investigated accusations? 
 
The risks imposed on the company obviously differ with regard to the two aforemen-
tioned categories.  
 
In the vast majority of cases of the first category, the fronts are clear: the employee did 
act to the disadvantage of the company and thereby committed an offense, while the 
company – from a legal point of view – did nothing wrong, i.e. unlawful. Therefore, the 
company will usually not be at risk to be additionally sanctioned for what the employee 
did. Even more, the companies and any prosecution authority’s interest will be concur-
rent, i.e. both will have the interest to hold the employee liable for what he did.  
 
However, though any possible criminal proceedings occurring from that misconduct 
might not put the company at risk, the prosecutor’s investigation itself and any compul-
sory measures accompanied by it might do so. For example, a search might be likely to 
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attract public attention and also the mere disclosure of what happened might include 
the risk of severe reputational damages, especially in cases where the misconduct disclos-
es a weakness in the company’s internal control system.  
 
It should also be noted that even in these cases, depending on the facts of the single case, 
a prosecution authority might take another point of view and investigate a possible lia-
bility of the company or its management. That might in particular be the case, if the 
employee’s offense was enabled by a significant lack of adequate compliance procedures 
and controls due to an omission of the company’s management (cf. Section 130 of the 
Act on Regulatory Offenses).  
 
Thus, then the same situation as in the second category would exist: In these cases, there 
is a risk of severe sanctions against the company and the members of its management 
themselves. The main risk in such cases under German law – besides reputational and 
other immaterial risks – is a fine under Section 30 of the Act on Regulatory Offenses, 
especially in connection with Section 17 Paragraph 4 of the Act on Regulatory Offenses. 
Sanctions can be up to EUR 10 Mio and significantly higher in cases where any benefits 
the company has gained are skimmed. Additionally, the exclusion from public tenders 
or civil claims from business partners may ensue.    
 
The members of the management might be subject to personal fines of up to 1 Mio 
EUR (Section 130 of the Act of Regulatory Offenses), labor law consequences and, as 
the already mentioned “Neubürger” decision shows,5 substantial civil claims for damag-
es.  
 
In cases under foreign law, e.g. the FCPA, or where an international body, such as the 
World Bank, is involved, even higher financial sanctions or more severe sanctions of 
another kind, e.g. exclusion from any World Bank project, might be impending. In any 
case, defining the role of the company with regard to the alleged misconduct and by that 
determining the risks the company might face, belongs to the most important tasks to 
be performed by the company’s compliance function.6 The question whether a compa-
ny is just a victim or whether it might be subject to sanctions itself can significantly in-
fluence the process of the internal investigation and the way it is conducted.  
 
E. Why do companies conduct internal investigations? 			
5  supra I. A.; LG München I, Urteil vom 10.12.2013 – 5 HK O 1387/10 = NDCOMPLIANCE 22101 (2014). 
6  Cf. Sascha Süße, Der Compliance Officer im Fok" behördlicher Ermittlungen, NEWSDIENST COMPLIANCE 
71004 (2015). 
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As the constellations, in which internal investigations are conducted, differ, the same 
applies to the reasons why they are performed.7 However, one basic aim underlies all 
internal investigations: To keep the negative impact arising from the misconduct or 
breach of law as little and low as possible for the company and the members of its man-
agement.  
 
If the company is a victim with regard to a single employee’s misconduct, the internal 
investigation aims to define any damage that might have occurred and to allow the man-
agement to determine how successful any reclaims against the employee or involved 
third parties might be. In such cases, the company will initiate all necessary sanctions 
against the employee, which might include charging a criminal offense. The latter might 
be particularly necessary if there are strong indications for the alleged misconduct, but 
the last and convincing evidence cannot be retrieved by the company without the help 
of a state agency, such as the evidence of an incoming payment to or a withdrawal from 
the employee’s private bank account, to which the company has and can get no access, 
but a prosecutor might. Additionally, in cases of complex economic contexts or where 
large amounts of data and information have to be reviewed and processed, it might be in 
the company’s interest to properly prepare the data for the prosecution authorities in 
order to catalyze preliminary proceedings or to ensure that the case is not closed because 
of a lack of factual understanding by the prosecutor.8 Cooperating with the prosecution 
authorities might in these cases be inevitable, not least in order for the management to 
fulfill its duty to secure all civil claims the company might have.  
 
In cases where criminal or administrative proceedings against the company itself and/or 
its organs or other top-level management are pending, conducting an internal investiga-
tion is a means of cooperation with the prosecution authorities.  This cooperation is not 
compulsory, since none of the parties is – in principle – legally obliged to cooperation or 
disclosure.9 However, in this cooperative-scenario, the company usually undertakes 			
7  Cf. Folker Bittmann, Die verfahrensrechtliche Relevanz der Einrichtung einzelner Compliance-Maßnahmen 
– Interne Ermittlungen a! Sicht der Staatsanwaltschaft, in Handbuch Criminal Compliance § 34 B. III. 3., 
1295, No.131 (Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015) with further references in footnote 26. 
8  For details see Helmut Görling, Compliance und Strafrecht, in Compliance Aufbau – Management – Risi-
kobereiche Chapter 6, 454 f., No. 22 ff. (Helmut Görling et al eds., 2010). 
9  Tine Golombek, Pflichten von G"chäftsleitungs- und Überwachungsorganen bei Verdacht auf Unregelmäßig-
keiten im Unternehmen, JOURNAL DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHTLICHEN VEREINIGUNG 163, 169 (2012); 
for an obligation to disclosure to public authorities, if there is a case in which there arises an obligation to 
correct a fiscal declaration pursuant to Section 153 of the Fiscal Code, cf. Oliver Sahan, Korruption als steuer-
strafrechtlich! R"iko, in Recht-Wirtschaft-Strafe, FS Erich Samson, 605 f. (Wolfgang Joecks et al. eds., 2010); 
Björn Krug & Christoph Skoupil, Die steuerliche Korrekturpflicht nach § 153 AO bei im Rahmen von Inter-	
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some or even the major part of the (internal) investigative work and commits to for-
warding the (essential) results of the internal investigation to the public authorities.10 In 
exchange, the company is able to exercise at least some or more influence on the course 
of the investigation. This cooperation also aims at reducing the risk for the company to 
be exposed to compulsory measures such as searches.11 Usually, the prosecution authori-
ties will accept to refrain from such measures only as long as they are convinced that the 
company’s internal investigation is conducted proper and transparent. Furthermore, 
cooperating with the prosecution authorities and supporting them with information 
and evidence might be considered as a mitigating factor by the prosecution authorities in 
cases where the company faces a fine, and thus reduce the monetary burden imposed on 
the company.12  
 
Finally, there are constellations, in which the cooperation between company and prose-
cution authority goes even further and the internal investigation is conducted by the 
company, respectively its criminal lawyers, on behalf of the prosecution authority.13 In 
these cases, all investigative actions are usually closely coordinated between the two. 
 
It should be noted that especially in cases where international, i.e. US-, authorities are 
involved, a cooperation as described regularly constitutes the only factual option if the 
company wants to walk out of this crisis safe and sound, and that the expectations re-
garding the company’s willingness to disclose all kinds of misconduct is distinctively 
higher. 
 
Secondary, but nevertheless often equally important, further intentions when conduct-
ing an internal investigation are getting information about the company’s compliance 
and internal control system, getting to know the truth, collecting the information for 			
nal Inv!tigations erlangten Erkenntn"sen zu korruptiven Handlungen in Unternehmen, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT 453, 453 (2015). 
10  This scenario is sometimes referred to as “the privatisation of criminal law enforcement“, cf. Jürgen Taschke, 
Compliance-Sachverhalte und Ablauf ein" Wirtschaftsstrafverfahrens – Wechselwirkungen zw!chen internen 
Untersuchungen und Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen, in Handbuch Criminal Compliance § 36 B., 1413, No. 2 
(Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015).  
11  Axel Kallmeyer & Matthias Freund & Oliver Kraft, Exkurs zum 3. und 4. Kapitel: Richtiges Verhalten bei 
Ermittlungen, in Korruption und Kartelle bei Auftragsvergaben 153 (Matthias Freund et al eds., 2008). 
12  Tine Golombek, Pflichten von G"chäftsleitungs- und Überwachungsorganen bei Verdacht auf Unregelmäßig-
keiten im Unternehmen, JOURNAL DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHTLICHEN VEREINIGUNG 163, 170 (2012); 
Dorothee Krull, Rechtliche Vorgaben, in Handbuch Internal Investigations Chapter 3, 107, No. 57 (Karl-
Christian Bay ed., 2013). 
13  Cf. Sascha Süße & Ken Eckstein, Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Bereich „Interne Untersuchung“, NEWSDIENST 
COMPLIANCE 71009 (2014). 
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any claims the company might have or it needs to recover assets as well as internally 
stressing that the company does not tolerate misconduct and thereby strengthening the 
compliance management system.   
 
F. Who precisely performs them? 
 
Internal investigations are performed by the company which has an interest in clarifying 
certain facts related to any potential misconduct of its employees or management or 
simply by the company that has to defend itself. The principal or, speaking in terms of 
internal processes, the owner of the internal investigation usually is the management, i.e. 
the executive board. In certain constellations, e.g. when the accusations under investiga-
tion are raised against one or several members of the executive board, the supervisory 
board may initiate the internal investigation. The investigation as a whole is regularly 
delegated to one function below the management level, often to the general counsel or 
to the compliance officer, whose responsibility it is to coordinate and ensure the ade-
quate, efficient and compliant conduct of the investigation. In larger companies, de-
tailed processes are determined with regard to the steps that have to be taken, the com-
pany functions that have to be involved and the external expertise that has to be ob-
tained. However, in practice, especially in medium sized or small companies or in com-
panies which put their focus on repressive compliance for the first time, one very often 
realizes that these processes do not exist or are not clearly defined with regard to the 
assignment of competences. Especially in those cases where parallel criminal proceedings 
exist, these shortcomings can lead to a number of negative consequences. 
 
The coordination function will need support by a number of other company functions, 
such as internal audit, human resources, finance, IT, public relations and the operative 
units such as senior management of sales and distributions or research and development. 
Additionally, especially in cases of parallel criminal proceedings, the involvement of a 
lawyer specialized in corporate criminal law will be mandatory. In international cases, 
foreign lawyers are often needed as further support. Depending on the evidence that has 
to be retrieved and the amount and availability of the company’s in-house know how, 
an external IT-Forensic expert has to be involved. In some cases, the supplementary 
expertise of an accounting firm or a forensic department of such might be valuable. 
However, it should not be overseen that with a growing number involved, the coordina-
tion task becomes more complex and, from the point of view of a prosecution authority, 
also the number of potential informants rises.       
 
G. What is done?  
 
First of all, the hypotheses which will be investigated by the company have to be deter-
mined and precisely defined. In the course of the investigation these might be amended 
or adjusted due to further knowledge gained in the meantime. However, especially 
where the suspicion of a committed crime is investigated and parallel criminal proceed-
ings are pending, working with hypotheses is important in order to focus the investiga-
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tion on what is relevant and not to waste time on maybe interesting, but legally irrele-
vant facts.   
 
One main task for those conducting the internal investigation is to collect evidence for 
justifying the hypotheses defined and for supporting or defending against any accusa-
tion under investigation by the prosecution authorities. The collecting of evidence itself 
must certainly be compliant with all applicable laws, i.e. must not violate any criminal, 
data protection or labor laws. Also, it must be defined for what purposes the evidence is 
collected, i.e. for defending the company, for bringing criminal, labor or civil charges 
against the employee, for recovering assets etc. Such usage also stresses the importance of 
properly gaining any evidence, because otherwise, its utilization in a later court hearing 
might be at risk.  
 
All evidence collected is usually put together to draft the story line of what has hap-
pened, and summed up in a report on the results of the internal investigation, which 
will usually be discussed and agreed upon with the compliance or legal function within 
the company, and finally presented to the management as the basis for deciding about 
the further measures to be taken.   
II. COLLECTING EVIDENCE  
 
  As described, collecting evidence is one of the main tasks while conducting an internal 
investigation. Basically, in practice one can differentiate between three kinds of evi-
dence: First, written evidence, both digital and hard-copy, such as e-mails, letters, notes, 
and also accounts, invoices or other supporting documents; secondly, oral evidence, 
which is provided to the internal investigators by employees or the management; and 
thirdly, evidence gathered from background researches, such as information from data-
bases or public registers.   
 
There are several ways to collect these evidences, with e-mail searches, interviewing em-
ployees, reviewing documents and performing background researches being the most 
important ones. 
 
A. E-mail searches 
 
Today, communication via e-mail has become the most important way to exchange 
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information, also in business.14 Therefore, e-mail searches are an important source of 
knowledge for the purposes of internal investigations, while at the same time, they are 
very often considered a substantial impairment of rights by employees and work coun-
cils. Though several questions regarding the preconditions for the permissibility of e-
mail searches are still controversially discussed,15 these preconditions are usually met in 
the context of criminal offenses, especially in cases where a concrete suspicion against a 
concrete employee exists and parallel state investigations are ongoing.16 Companies can 
also reduce possible risks relating to e-mail searches in advance by implementing a rea-
sonable framework of internal regulations regarding the use of the company’s IT-
systems. 17 
 
With regard to the practical process, first of all the relevant data has to be determined, 
i.e. the hard and server drives as well as the accounts that have to be searched have to be 
collected and specified. Additionally, the investigation team needs to know when and 
how often back-ups are made. After a professional copying, time filters have to be im-
plemented and the data has to be de-duplicated and cleaned before it can be searched. If 
no special in-house IT-expertise is at hand, external IT-forensic- respectively e-discovery-
experts have to be involved. One crucial task that follows is the determination of search 
terms that ensure that the relevant documents and conversations are filtered and found. 
The hits produced by applying these search terms then have to be reviewed by the com-
pany or external lawyers. 
 
B. Interviewing employees 
 
Another essential source of knowledge to elucidate compliance-offenses is interviewing 
employees.18 The majority of tasks within a company are delegated to the employees 			
14  Sascha Süße & Ken Eckstein, Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Bereich „Interne Untersuchung“, NEWSDIENST 
COMPLIANCE 71009 (2014). 
15  Jürgen Detlef W. Klengel & Ole Mückenberger, Internal Inv!tigations - typ!che Rechts- und Prax!probleme 
unternehmensinterner Ermittlungen, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 81, 83 (2009); Anja Mengel 
& Thilo Ullrich, Arbeitsrechtliche Aspekte unternehmensinterner Inv!tigations, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
ARBEITSRECHT 240, 242 (2006). 
16  For the prerequisites see Section 32 of the Federal Data Protection Act; moreover LAG Berlin-Brandenburg,  
Urteil vom 16.2.2011 − 4 Sa 2132/10 = NZA-RR 342, 343 (2011) and for an overview of the relevant criminal 
and data protection law provisions see Jörg Eisele, Datenschutzstrafrecht, in  Handbuch Criminal Compliance 
§ 23, 762-798 (Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015). 
17  Cf. details Tim Wybitul & Wolf-Tassilo Böhm, E-Mail-Kontrollen für Compliance-Zwecke und bei internen 
Ermittlungen, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 133, 133 (2015). 
18  Sascha Süße & Ken Eckstein, Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Bereich „Interne Untersuchung“, NEWSDIENST 
COMPLIANCE 71009 (2014). 
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who generally have the highest factual proximity and consequently the best knowledge 
of the concrete business processes and thus the subjects of the internal investigation. 
Additionally, the typical compliance violations such as corruption and anti-trust breach-
es are covert and victimless criminal offenses. To find all necessary evidence in writing 
hardly never happens, as the giving of a bribe or the concluding of a price agreement is 
usually done personally and/ or orally. Therefore, in many cases the line of argument 
needs to be based on information provided by employees. Due to the fact that this kind 
of inquiry is highly sensitive and unpredictable, it is important to be well prepared. 
Time, location, interviewer and sequence of interview partners have to be determined at 
first. Furthermore, the interview structure and at least general questions should be pre-
defined. Another important aspect is what kind of interview shall be conducted – will it 
just be an exploratory inquiry or is the interviewee a (potential) suspect? In any case, the 
interviewer needs to be able to react quickly and appropriately to new situations or top-
ics coming up in the course of the interview. Further issues are the questions how to 
document the information,19 whether to present any protocol made to the interviewee 
and if a third person is allowed to be present, e.g. a member of the work’s council or a 
lawyer representing the interviewee. Finally, in practice one of the most important as-
pects is, if and to what extent the interviewed employee is under a legal duty to present 
evidence at all.20  	
C. Review of documents  
 
Besides interviewing employees and e-mail searches, there are usually documents in hard 
copy to be reviewed, as well. This includes organigrams, letters, contracts, financial doc-
uments, such as invoices and other supporting documents, and e-mails that have been 
printed, but do not exist digitally anymore. These documents can be found in different 
places of the company, for example in the office of the suspected employee, in his de-
partment or in the accounting department. Internal advice by other employees might be 
very helpful in this context.  	
D. Background researches  
 
Background researches can focus on obtaining addresses or other contact details, infor-
mation about businesses or companies owned or positions held by an employee, interre-			
19  Thomas C. Knierim, Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit d! externen Compliance-Beraters, in Handbuch 
Criminal Compliance § 7, 242, No. 37 (Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015). 
20  Infra III. D. 2. a.  
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lations between employees and third parties or business partners, any former miscon-
duct of the employee or even if a business partner might be listed on any index or even 
terror list. 
 
Very often background researches are part of the preventive measures of the compliance 
management system, e.g. with regard to business partner screenings or the prevention of 
money laundering. Thus, the company might be able to revert to already used databases 
within the company when conducting an internal investigation. Additionally, even 
simple searches with common internet search engines and communication platforms 
might produce interesting information. Further, professional databases containing fi-
nancial, personal and political information as well as public registers can be consulted.21 
Especially in an international context it might be useful to mandate professional services 
that conduct research locally or even on-site. 
III.  RISKS OF PARALLEL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR THE COMPANY  
 
  Conducting an internal investigation is a different task for any company, as it is regular-
ly based upon accusations against employees or members of the management and often 
causes disturbance within the company. It becomes even more challenging, if parallel 
criminal proceedings are pending. In the following, the main risks occurring from paral-
lel criminal proceedings shall be described, while a special emphasis is put on constella-
tions where the company or its management might be held liable for the wrongdoing of 
employees. 
	
A. Risk of the company’s premises being searched 
 
The search of the company’s premises can be conducted pursuant to Section 103 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure even if the company itself is not suspected. Such a search 
might be the starting point from which the company gets to know that official proceed-
ings are pending. If, however, the allegations come up before and a cooperative relation-
ship22 has been established, as it has become rather common and developed into a widely 
accepted model over the last years23, the risk of such searches is considerably lower. Nev-			
21  For more details see Steffen Salvenmoser & Heiko Schreier, Private Ermittlungen, in Handbuch Wirtschafts-
strafrecht Chapter 15, 1693 f., No. 87 ff. (Hans Achenbach et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2012). 
22  supra I. E.  
23  Nina Nestler, Internal Inv!tigations: Definition und rechtstatsächliche Erkenntn#se, in Internal Investigati-
ons – Ermittlungen im Unternehmen Chapter 1, 4 ff., Nos. 5 ff., 11 ff., 16 ff. (Thomas C. Knierim et al eds., 
2013). 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 1   2016 
SASCHA SÜßE & CAROLIN PÜSCHEL |   
COLLECTING EVIDENCE IN INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PARALLEL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE  40 
ertheless, it should be noted that public authorities are not prevented from undertaking 
such additional measures, since they are even in the case of an extensively cooperative 
attitude of the company still legally obliged to determine the proceedings and critically 
scrutinize the cooperation and findings presented to them. However, in any case the 
prosecution authorities have to check the necessity of their actions with regard to the 
prohibition on excessiveness of state actions.24 
 
If the company and the public authorities did either not establish a cooperative relation-
ship or the cooperation was established but ended, usually by the public authorities and 
most often due to doubts of the public authorities concerning the willingness of the 
company to fully cooperate,25 state investigation measures might be conducted without 
a (further) warning. This bears the risk to take the company by surprise, especially, if the 
cooperation is ended tacitly, that is without a notice to the company from the prosecu-
tion authorities.   
 
One of the special characters of a search of the premises of a company is that it is regular-
ly not only conducted by a higher number of officials compared to a search of an indi-
vidual person’s habitation, but that it is also more likely to be accompanied by media 
coverage.26 In addition to these circumstances, the fact that typically a lot of documents 
and data will be searched and seized can often lead to severe interruptions in operating 
business processes.27 The search of a company can hence often bear economical risks for 
the company.28  
	
B. Risk of an employee’s habitation being searched 
 
Another risk that is implied by criminal proceedings parallel to internal investigations is 			
24  Cf. Folker Bittmann, Internal Inv!tigations under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL 74, 87 
(2015). 
25  Cf. Thomas C. Knierim, Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit d! externen Compliance-Beraters, in Hand-
buch Criminal Compliance § 7, 253 f., No. 67 (Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015); Cornelia Gädigk, Außensicht der 
Strafj"tiz, in Internal Investigations – Ermittlungen im Unternehmen Chapter 18, 535, No. 20 (Thomas C. 
Knierim et al eds., 2013). 
26  TIDO PARK, HANDBUCH DURCHSUCHUNG UND BESCHLAGNAHME Nos. 854, 857 (2nd ed. 
2009); Jürgen Taschke, Compliance-Sachverhalte und Ablauf ein" Wirtschaftsstrafverfahrens, in  Handbuch 
Criminal Compliance § 36, 1414, No. 6 f. (Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015). 
27  TIDO PARK, HANDBUCH DURCHSUCHUNG UND BESCHLAGNAHME Nos. 854, 857, 895 (2nd 
ed. 2009). 
28  Silvia Ziebell, Unternehmensbezogene A!wirkungen und Einbettung in die Unternehmensabläufe, in Inter-
nal Investigations – Ermittlungen im Unternehmen Chapter 12, 333 f., No. 37-42 (Thomas C. Knierim et al 
eds., 2013). 
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the risk that not only the premises of the company are searched but also the habitations 
of employees or the management. If the company becomes aware of the criminal pro-
ceedings for the first time due to a search of the company’s premises, it is very likely that 
at the same time individuals at the center of the allegations get to know it as well.29 In 
many cases, searches of the company’s premises and the habitations of the accused are 
performed parallel. The personal impact of such a compulsory measure is, as one can 
imagine, high, because even if the officials act carefully, it is very likely that neighbors or 
even the media might take notice of that measure which usually leads to rumors and 
(further) suspicions, thereby not only affecting the professional but also the private 
sphere of the accused.   
 
In addition to those individuals under suspicion, some cases have shown that there is 
also a risk that the compliance function or any other function conducting or coordinat-
ing a parallel internal investigation for the company might be or come into the focus of 
the prosecution authorities and thereby become subject to a search of their private habi-
tations.30  
 
The question if such a search is legal was the subject of legal proceedings before the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). The background to 
these proceedings may be summarized as follows: In August 2010, a newspaper pub-
lished an article made publicized criminal proceedings inter alia related to bribery charg-
es against a company. Until then, these proceedings had been unknown to the con-
cerned company itself. The later appellant was the authorized representative and the 
head of the legal department of the company and thereupon took measures to clear up 
the related circumstances in order to prepare a defense, such as copying relevant docu-
ments and briefing the directors regarding the results of the internal investigation and 
the actions of the legal department in anticipation of a search of the business premises.  
 
After the latter had been performed at the end of 2010, the Regional Court 
(Amtsgericht) Stuttgart issued a second search warrant, this time with regard to the 
habitations of the appellant in November 2011.31 The court stated that the appellant was 
suspected of having undertaken actions to destroy, cover up or remove evidence for the 
non-compliant behavior that was the subject of the criminal proceedings. The suspicion 			
29  Silvia Ziebell, Unternehmensbezogene A!wirkungen und Einbettung in die Unternehmensabläufe, in Inter-
nal Investigations – Ermittlungen im Unternehmen Chapter 12, 331, No. 25 (Thomas C. Knierim et al eds., 
2013). 
30  Sascha Süße, Der Compliance Officer im Fok" behördlicher Ermittlungen, NEWSDIENST COMPLIANCE 
71004 (2015).  
31  Amtsgericht Stuttgart, Beschluss vom 7.11.2011 – Az. 28 Gs 1251/11. 
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was based upon an e-mail written by the appellant shortly after the publication of the 
newspaper article. In this e-mail, the appellant informed the directors that all IT-data of 
an employee, who was centrally involved in the circumstances which were subject mat-
ters to the criminal proceedings, had been stored to a hard drive, which had been given 
to an external law firm for review. Furthermore, he informed the directors that backup 
copies of all paper documents had been made and that these documents were stored 
under seal in the legal department. Finally, he informed them that the legal department 
was preparing model cases in consultation with the external law firm. The purpose of 
these model cases was to present them to the public authorities once the criminal pro-
ceedings were communicated directly to the company. 
 
The court held that this e-mail gave rise to the suspicion that the appellant did not only 
undertake legitimate actions to prepare a defense and by this e-mail mainly informed the 
directors about these legitimate actions, but instead indirectly informed them about the 
measures undertaken to destroy, cover up or remove evidence for the non-compliant 
behavior concerned. The appellant contested the search warrant, but the District Court 
of Stuttgart held up the decision of the Regional Court.32 Thereupon, the appellant 
lodged a constitutional complaint.  
 
The German Federal Constitutional Court dismissed the contested decision of the Dis-
trict Court on March 13th 2014, ruling that the search warrant and the decision lacked 
sufficient findings regarding the constitution of an adequate suspicion against the appel-
lant as required by Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legal basis for the 
search of the habitation of the appellant.33 The court argued that it was factually im-
proper to base the suspicion against the appellant on actions that were well within the 
scope of actions objectively necessary to clear up the circumstances related to the crimi-
nal proceedings against the company. Moreover, the court held that the District Court 
had failed in taking into consideration that the appellant was also obliged to undertake 
the mentioned appropriate actions due to his position as authorized representative and 
head of the legal department of the company and therefore did not exceed or misuse his 
competences. More importantly, the court stressed that a legally adequate suspicion for 
a search warrant could never be based mainly on the fact that the person concerned had 
a factual proximity, knowledge and competence in relation to the subject of a criminal 
proceeding.  
 
In conclusion, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court shows that a 			
32  Landgericht Stuttgart, Beschluss vom 29.3.2012 – Az. 17 Qs 14/12. 
33  BVerfG, Beschluss vom 13.3.2014 – Az. 2 BvR 974/12 = NDCOMPLIANCE 21017 (2014). 
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search of the habitation of an employee of a company in the focus of the public authori-
ties is not a mere formality, but instead has to be based on qualified facts that give rise to 
a suspicion against the employee himself. However, the decision shows that public au-
thorities and courts tend to apply a particular critical position on the actions of employ-
ees in response or in apprehension of criminal proceedings against the company. 	
C. Risk of documents being seized 
 
Nonetheless and as stated before, the search of the premises of a company or of the habi-
tation of an employee is not an end in itself, but instead is ordered to gather evidence 
regarding the respective proceedings.34 In the absolute majority of cases in which a 
search is conducted, the question therefore arises, whether the ensuing seizure of docu-
ments was legal. This question has been standing at the center of a couple of decisions 
by German courts. In the following, three of them, which are directly related to the 
conduct of internal investigations, shall highlight the different approaches that have 
been taken by the courts.  
 
In the first case, the supervisory board of a company assigned an external law firm with 
the conduction of an internal investigation to clarify the circumstances leading to the 
suspicion that members of the management board had been acting in a non-compliant 
way while making business decisions, which caused a significant financial damage to the 
company. The law firm took several actions to investigate the circumstances. In particu-
lar, members of the law firm interviewed former and present employees of the company, 
while promising the interviewed persons that the contents of their interview would 
remain confidential. At the end of the investigation, the law firm gathered the relevant 
information within a summarizing report. This report was forwarded to the prosecutor, 
with whom the company (principally) cooperated. After the law firm, which was in the 
possession of all the documents produced during the internal investigation, declined the 
prosecutor’s demand to surrender not only the interview protocols, but also all further 
minutes produced during the investigation, the Regional Court of Hamburg ordered 
that all relevant documents were a subject to legal seizure.35 The District Court of Ham-
burg affirmed this decision.36 Consequently, the legal finding of this case was that all 
relevant documentation of an internal investigation is a legal subject to seizure, if the 
documents were in the possession of an external law firm mandated by the company to 
conduct the internal investigation and therefore, so the court held, not in the possession 			
34  supra III. A. 
35  AG Hamburg, Beschluss vom 16.9.2010 – Az. 166 Gs 226/10. 
36  LG Hamburg, Beschluss vom 15.10.2010 – Az. 608 Qs 18/10 (“HSH-Nordbank“). 
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of the defense counsel of the accused individual as – in the courts opinion – required by 
Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.37 
 
In a second decision, the District Court of Mannheim came to a different verdict in a 
similar constellation, arguing that the revision of Section 160a Paragraph 1 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure that had become effective on February 1st 2011 had led to a 
strengthening of the privileged lawyer/client relationship. Consequently, the court ruled 
that the seizure of documents was illegal, if the documents had been produced in the 
course of an internal investigation and were in the possession of an external legal counsel 
mandated by a company to conduct an internal investigation in relation to circumstanc-
es giving rise to official proceedings against an individual associated with the company. 
On the other hand, the court held that documents in the possession of the company 
itself were still subject to legal seizure, since these documents would not be considered 
protected by the privileged lawyer/client relationship.38 
 
The court therefore examined the total stock of the seized documents and declared the 
seizure of documents illegal, if a relation to the mandate was recognizable, which was, 
the court held, the case for the report of the lawyers to the company and for all docu-
mentation collected for the lawyers with the intent to provide an informational basis for 
this report. The court then decided – against the ruling of the District Court of Ham-
burg – that this comprises even documents that contained statements of employees, 
who were essentially not part of the lawyer/client relationship, if these statements were 
answers to questions asked by the lawyers within their mandate, since such contents 
were regularly “inevitable commingled”.39 However, the court also stated that the pro-
hibition of seizure would not stand, if other documents not falling in the given catego-
ries were improperly displaced to and stored at the premises of the lawyer with the in-
tention to have them exempted from seizure.40  
 
In the third and most recent decision, the District Court of Braunschweig had to decide 
in a similar constellation, whether a search of the premises of the appellant and the ensu-
ing seizure of documents with regard to administrative charges against a company were 
legal. Preceding the lawsuit, there had been a search of the premises of the appellant, 
conducted on Mai 14th 2014, due to the criminal investigation against a person X, who 			
37  LG Hamburg, NJW 942 ff. (2011); critically KEN ECKSTEIN, ERMITTLUNGEN ZU LASTEN DRIT-
TER 122 ff. (2013). 
38  LG Mannheim, Beschluss vom 3.7.2012 – Az. 24 Qs 1, 2/12.  
39  See Nos. 113-115 and 117-119 of the grounds. 
40  See No. 116 and 122 of the grounds. 
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was associated with the appellant.41 In response, the appellant engaged an independent 
external law firm to perform an internal investigation to clear up the related circum-
stances. On March 10th 2015, the authorities performed another search of the premises of 
the appellant, this time due to criminal tax procedures against a person Y, who was like-
wise associated with the appellant.42 In the course of this second search, documents of 
the internal investigation of the appellant regarding the circumstances of the proceed-
ings against X were found in the office of the chief financial officer of the appellant and 
later on officially seized.43 Thereupon, the appellant contested the search and the seizure 
at the District Court of Braunschweig. 
 
After deciding that the search itself was legal, the court evaluated whether the seized 
documents – or at least some of them – had to be classified as defense material pursuant 
to Section 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that case, their seizure, performed 
by the authorities pursuant to Section 108 Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure (chance discovery), would have been prohibited and consequently illegal. Since the 
court ruled that documents for defense purposes must be exempted from seizure, if they 
are in the possession of the incriminated person, the only argument against the classifica-
tion of the concerned documents as defensive works was that there had been no pro-
ceedings against the appellant itself at the time of the internal investigation. Therefore, it 
was questionable whether the seized documents could nonetheless have been produced 
with the intent to use them for defense purposes.  
 
The court however ruled that documents could also be worth being protected as docu-
mentation for defense purposes, if a person was apprehensive of future criminal or ad-
ministrative proceedings and if the documents were, due to this apprehension, produced 
with the intent to prepare a defense. Considering the means of defense preparation, the 
court furthermore held that the conduction of an internal investigation could be quali-
fied as a substantial means of preparing an effective defense, if its purpose was to gain 
information regarding an assumed criminal or administrative offense. Thus, the court 
ruled that documents produced during an internal investigation have to be treated as 
documents for defense purposes, if they have the recognizable corresponding objective 
to prepare a future defense. 
 
Regarding the present case, the court found that the appellant had reason to assume that 
the first search of his premises and the related charges against X might be followed by 			
41  AG Braunschweig, Beschluss vom 23.4.2014 – Az. 7 Gs 1017/14. 
42  AG Braunschweig, Beschluss vom 20.1.2015 – Az. 7 Gs 174/15. 
43  AG Braunschweig, Beschluss vom 25.3.2015 – Az. 7 GS 735/15.  
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 1   2016 
SASCHA SÜßE & CAROLIN PÜSCHEL |   
COLLECTING EVIDENCE IN INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PARALLEL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE  46 
administrative proceedings against the company and/or its organs or subsidiaries. Addi-
tionally, the court found that the internal investigation had focused on the clarification 
of circumstances relating to this specific issue and that the documents were not only 
gathered by an independent external law firm, which was mandated especially for the 
conduct of the internal investigation, but were also dated to approximately half a year 
after the first search, so that there was a recognizable timely connection to the search and 
the proceedings against X. Consequently, the court ruled that some of the seized docu-
ments were exempted from seizure at least insofar as they had been produced with the 
recognizable intent to prepare a defense as shown with reference to the standards men-
tioned by the court. However, while the court decided that the internal investigation 
report was exempt from seizure, it stressed that the report of the internal audit in this 
case was a legitimate subject to seizure, since the latter was produced earlier and merely 
stated that its purpose was “future behavior and actions” without further relation to 
defensive actions or a defense strategy.44 
 
Looking at these cases, it becomes obvious that there is no consistent approach by the 
courts with regard to the seizure of documents produced in internal investigations, 
whether they are found in the company or at the advising law firm. As no all-embracing 
decision by the German Supreme Court (BGH) is apparent, some legal uncertainty 
remains as well as the risk that a prosecution authority will at first instance insist that the 
seizure of documents of the aforementioned kind is legal.  
	
D. Risks resulting from testimonies of employees  
 
As we have seen above, information provided by employees is one of the most im-
portant sources for the employer when collecting evidence in an internal investigation.45 
Likewise, they are of great importance for criminal proceedings by the prosecutor. Thus, 
in several different constellations, the prosecutor and the officials acting for him try to 
get statements and testimonies from employees of the company. The main underlying 
question in all those constellations is, whether the employee is required to give evidence, 
either to the authorities or the company – or to both.  
 
In general, employees cannot rely on the right to refuse testimony as a professional bear-
er of secrets pursuant to Section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if they are acting 
			
44  LG Braunschweig, Beschluss vom 21.7.2015 – Az. 6 Qs 116/15 = NDCOMPLIANCE 21021 (2015). 
45  supra II. B. 
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on behalf of their company.46 However, they have the right to refuse testimony with 
regard to Section 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if they would incriminate them-
selves or a close family member.  
 
If there are parallel criminal proceedings, two main risks arise, that are explained in the 
following.  
	
1. The questioning of employees during a search 
 
The search of a company’s premises is an unusual and stressful situation for any em-
ployee involved. Providing accurate information in such a situation is not easy. Know-
ing this, the public authorities sometimes try to seize the hour and informally interro-
gate employees during the search. Even though an employee cannot rely on the afore-
mentioned rights to refuse testimony, he will nonetheless regularly not be obliged to 
give testimony. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that, apart from giving the basic 
personal details, it is not compulsory to make statements to the police, who will regular-
ly be the ones conducting the search.47 On the other hand, even if a prosecutor was pre-
sent during the search and asked an employee to give testimony as a witness, the em-
ployee would only have to follow this order, if handed an official summons on that very 
occasion and if he was given the right to consult a legal representative beforehand pur-
suant to Section 68b Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
 
Nonetheless, the informal questioning of an employee during a search of the company’s 
premises can bear risks for the company. For instance, if the employees are unaware of 
their rights to refuse testimony and feel intimidated by the presence and appearance of 
the public authorities, they might give ambiguous, false or unnecessarily excessive in-
formation. Even though the employee might only be mistaken with regard to what he 
said, these information will be present in the files and it becomes quite hard to correct 
them. Another risk might be that, when the main proceedings are directed against a 
business partner, legally not mandatory, extensive and maybe false statements of em-
ployees can not only harm the business partner, but also the mutual business relations 
			
46  The right to refuse testimony pursuant to Section 52 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will normally also 
not apply, cf. in detail Sascha Süße, Der Compliance Officer im Fok" behördlicher Ermittlungen, NEWS-
DIENST COMPLIANCE 71004 (2015). 
47  Katharina Kusnik, Wenn die Staatsanwaltschaft im Unternehmen ermittelt: Abläufe und Verhaltensleitli-
nien bei einer Durchsuchung der G!chäftsräume, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 22, 27 (2015). 
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and thereby the company itself.48  
	
2. The utilization of statements of employees made in interviews  
 
The second aspect is in how far the prosecutor can utilize the information that was pre-
sented to him by the company, who gained the information in the course of an internal 
investigation, especially during an interview, and by which an employee incriminates 
himself or others. 
	
a. The duty of employees to participate in interviews 
 
The first question coming up in this context is whether an employee has to participate 
in an interview demanded by the company. Often an employee might not want to an-
swer the questions he is asked, for instance because he does not want to denunciate col-
leagues or more importantly, himself. The subsequent question is, if any obligation to 
participate also includes the obligation to provide information even if it is self-
incriminating. The determining principles for answering these questions originate main-
ly from labor law and not from the specific provisions of criminal procedure, since an 
internal investigation is – in principle – solely of a private character to the company. 
 
As a starting point, it is beyond dispute that the employee can be ordered to participate 
in the interview due to the employer’s executive prerogative pursuant to Section 242 of 
the Civil Code and Section 106 of the Industrial Code.49 Considering that the employee 
initially assumed the tasks delegated by the employer to him in a voluntary fashion 
when concluding his labor contract, it is well arguable and agreed upon that the em-
ployee is at least also principally obliged to answer all questions concerning the core 
aspects of his personal work activities truthfully and completely, at least if he doesn’t 
incriminate himself.50 Apart from this starting point, a lot of aspects concerning the 
rights and duties of an employee in an interview are subject to a very controversial legal 
debate, especially regarding the questions, if the employee is furthermore obliged to give 			
48  Katharina Kusnik, Wenn die Staatsanwaltschaft im Unternehmen ermittelt: Abläufe und Verhaltensleitli-
nien bei einer Durchsuchung der G!chäftsräume, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 22, 28 (2015). 
49  Cf. ANJA MENGEL, COMPLIANCE UND ARBEITSRECHT 118, No. 20 (2009). 
50  KLAUS MOOSMAYER, COMPLIANCE – PRAXISFADEN FÜR UNTERNEHMEN 90, No. 327 (3rd 
ed. 2015). The legal supplement for this entitlement of the employer is either seen in Sections 666, 675 Abs. 1 
of the Civil Code, Sections 611, 241 Abs. 2 of the Civil Code, sometimes cited in conjunction with Sections 242 
of the Civil Code, in case of an agency in conjunction with Sections 662 ff. of the Civil Code or in fiduciary 
duties generating from company law. 
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self-incriminating testimony,51 if he is entitled to have a legal advisor or a member of the 
work council present during the interview and if and to what extent the persons con-
ducting the interview have the obligation to instruct the employee with regard to his 
rights and duties (for instance regarding the – possible – right not to incriminate himself 
or that the information gained in the course of the interview might be forwarded to the 
prosecutor).52 
 
Regardless of these questions, one of the risks for the company in these cases is that the 
statement of an employee, in which he incriminates himself or other employees, simul-
taneously gives evidence of the violation of the organizational and supervisory duties of 
the company or its organs and therefore establishes the risk that the company is later on 
charged due to this violation.  
	
b. The utilization of interview protocols  
 
Subsequently, the question arises, whether the evidence gained and protocolled in the 
course of the interview may be utilized by the public authorities. This is highly disputed 
with regard to protocols containing self-incriminating statements of employees due to 
the fact that – the duty to give self-incriminating statements in an interview provided – 
the public authorities could thereby gain a self-incriminating testimony of the con-
cerned employee even though the employee would have had the right to refuse testimo-
ny when questioned as an accused person by the prosecution authorities themselves.53  			
51  Answering in the affirmative e.g. OLG Karlsruhe NSTZ 287 (1989); Thomas C. Knierim, Die strafrechtliche 
Verantwortlichkeit d! externen Compliance-Beraters, in  Handbuch Criminal Compliance § 7, 253 f., No. 67 
(Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015); Gina Greeve & Michael Tsambikakis, Individualvertretung im Strafverfahren, in 
Internal Investigations – Ermittlungen im Unternehmen Chapter 17, 508, No. 20 f. (Thomas C. Knierim et al 
eds., 2013); Martin Diller, Der Arbeitnehmer als Informant, Handlanger und Zeuge im Proz!s d! Arbeit-
nehmer gegen Dritte, DER BETRIEB 313, 314 (2004) with regard to the employee’s contractual main duties. 
Answering in the negative e.g. Imme Roxin, Probleme und Strategien der Compliance-Begleitung in Unter-
nehmen, STRAFVERTEIDIGER 116, 117 (2012);  Ralf Tscherwinka, Interne Ermittlungen zw!chen Selbstbel"-
tungsfreiheit und Fürsorgepflicht, in FS Imme Roxin 521, 529 (Lorenz Schulz et al. eds., 2012). Some however 
stress that in practice employees do regularly not refuse testimony with regard to their right to protection 
against self-incrimination, but with reference to blackouts see Gerlind Wisskirchen & Julia Glaser, Unter-
nehmensinterne Untersuchungen (Teil II), DER BETRIEB 1447, 1448 (2011); Mark Zimmer, Rolle der Mit-
arbeiter bei unternehmensinternen Ermittlungen – Arbeitsrechtliche Fragen bei der Aufklärung von Compli-
ance-Verstößen, RISK, FRAUD & COMPLIANCE 259, 260 (2011) with reference to the aforementioned. 
52  For an overview regarding these issues and the legal opinions see Sascha Süße & Ken Eckstein, Aktuelle 
Entwicklungen im Bereich „Interne Untersuchung“, NEWSDIENST COMPLIANCE 71009 (2014). 
53 Differentiating e.g. Folker Bittmann, Internal Inv!tigations under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE 
JOURNAL 74, 92 ff., 95 (2015); Renate Wimmer, Die Verwertbarkeit unternehmensinterner Untersuchungen, 
in FS Imme Roxin 537, 542 (Lorenz Schulz et al. eds., 2012). 
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These objections against the utilization of self-incriminating testimonies, however, do 
not apply to non self-incriminating testimony of other employees. In these cases, there is 
always the risk that the disclosure of all the information recorded in the protocols indi-
cates organizational or other compliance shortcomings.  
 
On the other hand, interview protocols containing non self-incriminating statements 
may generally be utilized by the company, e.g. for civil and labor law proceedings against 
the person who has committed the wrongdoing. However, there might be the risk that 
interviews unlawfully conducted lead to the prohibition of utilization of the protocol 
for the company. With regard to the yet unsettled questions regarding the conduction 
of interviews the securing of the possibility to utilize the protocols might be more legally 
challenging than expected.54   
	
E. Risk of a collision of investigative actions  
 
Another aspect that has to be taken into consideration is that an internal investigation 
might conflict with criminal proceedings. That is especially relevant with regard to col-
lecting evidence, in particular when interviewing employees. Usually, the company has 
an easy access to its employees. Additionally, the desire to talk to the employees as soon 
as the accusations come up, often with the idea that this means “everything will be 
cleared up soon”, is quite an understandable reaction of the management or the compli-
ance function. However, any interview with an employee means a more or less signifi-
cant impact on his memory. For that reason, the prosecution authorities sometimes 
want to have the first grasp on employees who are witnesses, while at the same time, the 
company equally wants to be the first to get the information from its employee.  
 
Furthermore, in some constellations the company might become aware of a suspicion 
against a certain employee and consequently might know prior to him that criminal 
proceedings against him are pending. In these cases, the company might come to the 
challenging situation to conduct an investigation, possibly at least partly against its own 
employee, without being allowed to inform the employee about these proceedings. 
While on the one hand this might be estimated as problematic in the light of the fiduci-
ary duty of the employer,55 on the other hand it might hinder the employer from taking 			
54  Cf. Dorothee Krull, Rechtliche Vorgaben, in Handbuch Internal Investigations Chapter 3, 129, No. 108 (Karl-
Christian Bay ed., 2013). 
55  The fiduciary duty of the employer inter alia includes the duty to protect the general right of privacy of the 
employee, see Ingrid Schmidt, Art. 2  [Allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit, Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht], in 
Erfurter Kommentar zum Arbeitsrecht Part 10 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Art. 1 - 
Art. 14), No. 68 f. (Rudi Müller-Glöge et al. eds., 16th ed. 2016).  
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actions under labor law against the employee.56  
 
In both constellations there is the risk that the company is blamed to hinder the state 
investigation or that the management or the compliance function are accused of ob-
structing the authorities (Section 258 of the Criminal Code). 
 
Another potential risk which is generally present when conducting an internal investiga-
tion, but might rise if employees know about criminal proceedings, is that employees 
overeagerly modify or destroy potential evidence, e.g. e-mails, contracts or invoices. 
Apart from the fact that this behavior might also fulfill Section 258 of the Criminal 
Code, these actions can most of the times be tracked and the data be regained by the 
prosecution authorities, at least if digital data is concerned. Thereby, the employees also 
put a potential cooperation between company and prosecution authorities at risk. 	
IV. WAYS FOR COMPANIES TO REDUCE RISKS 
 
  As aforementioned aspects display, a number of questions concerning the relation 
between internal investigations and criminal proceedings remain unsettled. The reason 
for this is mainly based on the fact that the concept of an internal investigation is rather 
new to the German criminal procedural law. It basically only developed over the last 
decade parallel to the increased level of formalization of compliance, the attention paid 
to compliance matters as such and the Anglo-American influence due to extended inves-
tigative powers of foreign prosecution authorities in the context of an ever growing 
international business environment.57  
 			
56  Cf. Klaus Moosmayer, Die verfahrensrechtliche Relevanz der Einrichtung einzelner Compliance-
Maßnahmen –Interne Ermittlungen a! unternehmensprakt"cher Sicht, in Handbuch Criminal Compliance 
§ 34 B. III. 1., 1272, No. 74 (Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015); for an overview of possible labour law and other ac-
tions against employees in these situations see DENNIS BOCK, CRIMINAL COMPLIANCE 275 f. (2011) 
and Dennis Bock, Aufsichtspflichten, §§ 130, 30 OWiG, in  Handbuch Criminal Compliance § 8, 278 f., No. 
36 f. (Thomas Rotsch ed., 2015). Imme Roxin however points out that disciplinary measures will not be ne-
cessary, if the employer cooperates with the prosecutor after he found out about the violation, since the initi-
ating and impending of criminal proceedings are the most effective means to ensure that an employee will 
not commit a compliance offense again see Imme Roxin, Probleme und Strategien der Compliance-Begleitung 
in Unternehmen, STRAFVERTEIDIGER 116, 121 (2012).  
57  See for example Martin Schorn & Johanna Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements nach neuem bri-
t!chen Recht - Perspektiven für unternehmensinterne Compliance und Inv!tigations, CORPORATE COMPLI-
ANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 211 (2014); Markus Rübenstahl, Der Foreign Corruption Practice Act (FCPA) der USA, 
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT 401 (2012). 
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Nevertheless, in practice, there are a number of measures that can be taken to reduce the 
risks that companies face in cases of conducting an internal investigation parallel to 
criminal proceedings.  
		
A. Cooperation with the prosecution authorities 
 
It is probably true, that the general approach of a company with regard to criminal pro-
ceedings is to cooperate with the prosecution authorities and to support the process of 
clarifying what has actually happened.58 This might give reason to ask why a company 
that cooperates should be in any way reluctant to provide the authorities with (all) in-
terview protocols produced during an internal investigation, any draft of an investiga-
tion report or all documents that are obviously connected with the accusations, may 
they be incriminating or not for the company or its management. Or in other words: 
Could the risks described above actually pose risks also for a cooperating company?  	
1. Conflicting priorities 
 
In fact, the company stands between two conflicting priorities.  
 
On the one hand, it is willing to comprehensively cooperate in order to reduce the risk 
of compulsory measures and to earn brownie points as it apprehends a financial sanc-
tion. On the other hand, the company does not want to incriminate itself or (single) 
members of the management in the first place.    
 
Bearing that in mind, it becomes rather likely that internal investigations conducted by a 
company will usually be neither totally neutral nor solely impartial. That comes with no 
surprise, as nobody actually expects a company to send itself to its doom without re-
sistance. Even more, such a behavior might conflict with the management’s duty to act 
in the best interest of the company.  Nonetheless, some compliance officers sometimes 
describe their way of conducting internal investigations as absolutely neutral and stress 
that they would collect evidence regardless of the reputation or the position of the in-
volved persons. While this approach is generally favorable, it must not be overseen that 
not only the company’s management but also the compliance officer or any other func-
tion conducting the internal investigation on behalf of the company must act in the best 
interest of the company. In particular, compliance officers are neither external police 			
58  KLAUS MOOSMAYER, COMPLIANCE – PRAXISFADEN FÜR UNTERNEHMEN 96, No. 350 (3rd 
ed. 2015). 
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officers nor the extended arm of the prosecution authorities. Thus, within the legally 
acceptable options the ones that best suit the company’s interest in the individual situa-
tion must be chosen.  
 
Insofar, there are significant differences between internal investigations when cooperat-
ing with the prosecution authorities in comparison to investigations performed in an 
international context, especially with the SEC under the FCPA.59 The procedure govern-
ing such investigations cannot be applied one to one on internal investigations conduct-
ed in the national context. 	
2.  Reasons why companies accept risks 
 
Stating that, it becomes obvious that there are reasons why the described risk scenarios 
above are real for the company under investigation. However, there are reasons why 
such a company might accept risks and e.g. refuse to hand in all evidence collected.  
 
Being willing to cooperate, does not automatically mean to forfeit all procedural rights 
the company has. If the criminal proceedings are solely targeting individuals, the com-
pany is merely a witness, however an endangered one as it might become secondary 
participant if the preconditions of Section 30 of the Act on Regulatory Offenses are 
fulfilled. At the latest when the company becomes secondary participant because of a 
procedure under Sections 29a or 30 of the Act on Regulatory Offenses, it is, according to 
Sections 444, 432 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, granted the same 
procedural rights as an accused individual. A company can nevertheless cooperate com-
prehensively and still refuse to hand out every single document that has been produced 
or found in the course of the internal investigation on the grounds of its procedural 
rights. Reasons for that might be that the information included goes beyond the scope 
of the criminal and administrative proceedings; or that business secrets are included for 
which a proper protection cannot be guaranteed by the prosecutor; or single infor-
mation might be misleading, because they are ambiguously drafted, and thus would 
arouse an unfounded initial suspicion by the prosecutor. Furthermore, as stated above, 
the company’s management is obliged to act in the company’s best interest. Thus, if 
only the disclosure of information for which no legal duty exists would give grounds for 
a sanction against the company, one can argue that the management breaches this duty. 			
59  For the characteristics of an investigation initiated by the SEC see FREDERIKE WEWERKA, INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS – PRIVATE ERMITTLUNGEN IM SPANNUNGSFELD VON STRAFPRO-
ZESSUALEN GRUNDSÄTZEN UND ANFORDERUNGEN EINES GLOBALISIERTEN WIRT-
SCHAFTSSTRAFVERFAHRENS 91-110 (2012). 
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Finally, the management might refuse to provide certain documents because of its fidu-
ciary duty towards its employees.  	
3.  Reducing risks by communication 
 
Having said this, on the other hand, when cooperating with the prosecution authorities 
it is indispensable that the internal investigation must be performed properly and in 
compliance with all applicable laws. Furthermore, any communication with the prose-
cution authorities must be made in good faith and without any inadmissible deceit. The 
aim to reduce the negative impact on the company from compulsory measures and sanc-
tions will usually only be reached, if the company cooperates in a confiding and reliable 
manner with the authorities. Prosecutors will regularly check the plausibility of the in-
formation provided by the company, at least on a random basis. The involvement of an 
experienced criminal lawyer can ensure that the company exercises all its procedural and 
legal rights and at the same time refrains from collecting evidence improperly, falsifying 
evidence gained or inadmissibly sugar-coating the outcome of the internal investigation.  
 
In this regard, the most crucial advice regarding a cooperation with the prosecution 
authorities is to maintain close and transparent communication with the authorities. In 
many cases, measures taken by the prosecutor that seem irrational or unexpected can be 
traced back to a misunderstanding in earlier communication. Therefore, it seems im-
portant to explain to the authorities what the company does in its investigation and how 
it conducts each single step. Depending on the approach by the prosecutor in the single 
case, it might be helpful to discuss an investigation map and hand out interim reports. 
For the discussion of operational aspects it can also be helpful to get (and stay) in touch 
with the investigating police unit. In the course of the criminal proceedings it is also 
advisable to stick to deadlines with regard to the handing in of documents or reports. In 
practice, however, delays are not uncommon. In such circumstances the timely and 
comprehensible explanation why a deadline needs to be postponed, should usually pre-
vent negative consequences. In most cases, a deliberate “Salami-tactic”, i.e. bit by bit just 
admitting what is respectively already known, is not recommendable and might lead to a 
silent termination of the cooperation by the prosecutor. Investigation reports should be 
clear and easy to read and to handle, especially with regard to the appendices. When 
handing in documents or statements that are ambiguous, an early annotation will pre-
vent the receiver from making wrong conclusions.  
 
Sticking to these basic rules usually keeps the cooperation alive and supports the aims of 
the company. That is not contradicted by the fact that in any case the company and its 
lawyers must exercise all procedural rights they deem to be appropriate and compete for 
legal opinions or the evaluation of facts wherever necessary.   
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4.  Considering further measures to reduce risks 
 
However, cooperation always means advantages on both sides. Though improvements 
can be witnessed over the last years, very often the prosecution authorities still have 
neither the capacities nor the expertise to effectively evaluate the large amounts of data 
seized in cases of alleged economic crimes. Long durations of proceedings are the result. 
If evidence is stored in another country, it will be even more difficult and time consum-
ing for the prosecutor to gain them via legal assistance of that country than just getting 
them handed in by the company.60 If, however, in the course of the cooperation it be-
comes evident that the cooperation becomes a one way street or if commitments by the 
prosecution authorities were broken, it is inevitable for the company and its lawyers to 
fearlessly consider the termination of the cooperation.  
 
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in by far the most cases a once started cooperation 
between the company and the prosecutor works until the end of the proceedings. Still, it 
would be unprofessional not to take the abovementioned risks into careful considera-
tion and to omit to reduce these risks or the possible negative effects arising from them.  
The following further aspects (B. to E.) should therefore be scrutinized by the internal 
investigator and – depending on each single case – observed where necessary. 
	
B.  Proper documentation of an internal investigation  
 
As the case regarding the search of an employee’s habitation61 shows, documentation of 
the steps that have been taken in the course of the investigation is crucial. An ambiguous 
wording or measures taken, but not explained properly or understandable at first glance, 
might lead to an initial suspicion. Thus, the person responsible for the conduct of the 
internal investigation should ensure that the documentation is made properly and regu-
larly, e.g. by preparing short notes or “work dones”, and that it is stored centrally and 
easily accessible. Furthermore, wherever appropriate, legal or technical experts for con-
ducting professional methods of collecting evidence should be involved.    	
C.  Conducting state-of-the-art interviews 
 
Even without parallel criminal proceedings, conducting interviews is one of the most 			
60  Cf. Imme Roxin, Probleme und Strategien der Compliance-Begleitung in Unternehmen, STRAFVERTEIDIGER 
116, 117 (2012). 
61  supra III. B. 
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common but also most ambitious tasks when conducting an internal investigation. The 
risk for the company in that context is that by incriminating himself the employee might 
also give grounds for sanctions against the company or its management. Thus, in such 
cases the company might also have the interest that a protocol of an interview, in which 
an employee has voluntarily incriminated himself, is not utilized. In other constellations, 
especially if the company is a victim to a fraudulent action by its employee, it is in the 
absolute interest of the company that the information provided by the employee can be 
utilized, as they might form the basis for any labor action, civil claim or criminal charge. 
 
Thus, in any case the company should ensure that the conduct of an interview is in con-
formity with all applicable laws, especially that no unduly pressure is put upon the in-
terviewee, that he is informed about the content of the questioning, that he knows the 
role of the interviewer and also what might happen with the information he provides, 
i.e. for what it might be used. Additionally, the information provided should be proper-
ly documented and, if appropriate, reviewed together with the interviewee. 		
D.  Labeling documents of an internal investigation with their purpose 
 
The different court decisions described above62 show that there is still a lot of uncertain-
ty with regard to the seizure of documents produced or collected in the course of an 
internal investigation. In any case, the risk remains that during a search the prosecution 
authorities may take a restrictive approach and try to seize them. Thus, in the first place, 
it is important to react properly in the very situation and to officially complain against 
that seizure. That should be accompanied by the demand to seal the documents con-
cerned (cf. Section 110 Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and 
to force a court decision on the seizure afterwards. 
 
Some further guidance regarding suitable risk limiting measures can be drawn from the 
decision of the District Court of Braunschweig. As shown, the court ruled that the doc-
umentation of an internal investigation can generally be seen as intended for defending 
the company and therefore be exempt from seizure.63 
 
Regarding the crucial factors for the acceptance of documents as defense material set out 
by the court, the challenge will be to demonstrate the specific “defense character” of the 
respective documents. This can be more difficult in some cases than in others. In the 
present case for instance, the internal investigation was conducted after the company 			
62  supra III. C. 
63  supra III. C. 
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had been searched, which – according to the court – basically showed that the internal 
investigation was conducted in response to the criminal proceedings and thus with the 
intent to prepare a defense. With regard to cases like this, the defense character of the 
documents produced should be established quite easily, even if the proceedings are not 
yet led against the company itself. However, in most of the cases where the offense in 
question was committed to the (assumed) benefit of the company or a violation of Sec-
tion 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offenses is at stake, proceedings with regard to Sec-
tion 30 of the Act on Regulatory Offenses will be expectable, even if at the time of the 
beginning of the internal investigation no criminal proceedings are pending.  
 
Furthermore, the court seemed to differentiate between documents produced by the 
internal audit department on the one hand and documents produced by the external 
law firm on the other hand. In the latter case, the documents were more likely to be 
considered as being produced in a defense context, since the company mandated the law 
firm in response to the search of the company’s premises and especially for the inter-
views. Nevertheless, the court pointed out that documents produced by the internal 
audit department can principally also be exempt from seizure.  
 
Thus, the most important criterion obviously seems to be the identifiable purpose of a 
document. The court held that the seizure of a document containing an audit report 
was legal, since the purpose of the report was not to prepare a defense for behavior in 
the past, but a strategy on how to behave in the future. Therefore, making sure that the 
defense purposes are sufficiently clear and expressively stated in the respective docu-
ments, can contribute to reduce the risk of seizure. 
 
Additionally, all documents produced in the course of the internal investigation and for 
the company’s defense should be stored separately from other documents of the com-
pany.64 Apart from that, it is still advisable to keep all sensible documents for defense 
purposes at the law firm that defends the company. 	
E.  Providing trainings and witness assistance for employees 
 
Finally, risk minimizing means can be taken with regard to statements or actions of em-
ployees.  
 
First, the employer should regularly and recurrently provide trainings for his employees 			
64  See also Ingo Minoggio, Interne Ermittlungen in Unternehmen, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis Chap-
ter 15, No. 58 (Marcus Böttger ed., 2nd ed. 2015).  
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regarding their rights and duties when confronted with the public authorities, especially 
regarding searches of the company’s premises. The employer should stress the im-
portance that employees be very restrictive or even better refusing with respect to giving 
information to the public authorities, in order not to endanger possible lines of defense 
or to present false or ambiguous evidence. However, employees could – in the interest 
of abbreviating the search – be allowed to support the investigating authorities on an 
organizational basis. Additionally, they should be informed that no evidence must be 
suppressed or destroyed. Most importantly, employees working at the reception of the 
company’s premises should be trained to inform the management and the legal depart-
ment immediately after the search has started so that a legal advisor can be informed or 
especially mandated on short notice and be present during the search.  
 
Moreover, if an employee has to give testimony to a public prosecutor or has to appear 
before court, the employer should provide witness assistance to safeguard the interests 
of the company. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
 
  Conducting an internal investigation is indisputably not an easy task. However, it be-
comes even more challenging if parallel criminal proceedings are pending. Especially in 
cases where the management and the company itself are at the risk of being sanctioned, 
collecting evidence might include gathering evidence to the disadvantage of the principal 
of the internal investigation. Nevertheless, if criminal proceedings are already pending, 
the advisable approach in most of these cases is to cooperate with the prosecution au-
thorities, especially in order to reduce the risks that parallel criminal proceedings impose 
on the company and the internal investigation conducted. These risks include in partic-
ular the search of the company’s premises or an employee’s or member of the manage-
ment’s habitation, the seizure and utilization of interview protocols and other docu-
ments produced in the course of the investigation and possible conflicts between inter-
nal and external investigative actions.  
 
Cooperation, however, does not mean at all that the company waives all its rights. Usu-
ally, cooperation that is based on transparent proceedings, the will to clarify what has 
happened and a professionally conducted investigation are in the interest of both parties 
to the cooperation. Nevertheless, as the prosecution authorities have wide discretional 
powers in deciding about taking compulsory measures against the company or terminat-
ing cooperation without further notice, it is important to consider appropriate measures 
to safeguard the legal defense rights that the company and its management have. A close 
communication with the prosecution authorities, ensuring a transparent documenta-
tion of the investigative measures taken, properly labeling the relevant documents and 
providing trainings for employees may diminish the risks of parallel proceedings with 
regard to the collecting of evidence in an internal investigation significantly.   
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court rulings. The article also shows how employers can effectively mitigate or avoid legal 
risks when monitoring emails. One of the main focuses of the overview is on recommend-
ed actions to take in practice and a checklist for preparing for and implementing access to 
business email accounts.	  
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I. TYPICAL REASONS FOR ACCESSING BUSINESS EMAILS 
 
   In many situations, it may be expedient for companies to access their employees' busi-
ness email accounts. Nowadays, business transactions are often only documented in 
emails. It is estimated that emails account for approximately 60–70% of business com-
munication.1 The growing significance of electronic communication within companies 
is also increasing the need for appropriate monitoring.2 A number of common reasons 
for accessing business email communication are listed below. The focus of the following 
points – in keeping with their high practical significance – is primarily on monitoring 
emails for the purpose of internal investigations, preparing for court proceedings or for 
other measures relating to the investigation of internal company matters. 
 
A. Business interests 
 
For business purposes, it may be advantageous if access to business email accounts is not 
only available to the individual employee, but also to colleagues or superiors. This not 
only makes it easier to work together on projects or archive emails, it also enables col-
leagues to promptly respond to incoming communications if the employee in question 
is on holiday or off sick. 
 
Companies also have a considerable interest in preventing employees from using their 
email account to send confidential company data to third parties or to their private 
email address. Such behavior by employees could fulfill the elements of the offence un-
der sec. 17 of the German Unfair Competition Act [Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb – UWG]. In practice, the criminal disclosure of trade and business secrets is 
often virtually impossible without access to corporate IT systems. Legal responses re-
quire that the company in question can also prove such breaches. Any subsequent inves-
tigations or criminal proceedings are usually unable to remedy the damage caused by the 
outflow of data. Employers therefore have a significant economic interest in preventing 
the illegal outflow of data effectively and in good time before trade secrets are obtained 
by unauthorized parties. As a rule, this can be achieved by appropriately monitoring 
email correspondence. 
 
B. Statutory document retention requirements 
 
It may also be necessary to access business email communication in order to meet statu-			
1
  Cf. Frank Peter Schuster, IT-gestützte interne Ermittlungen in Unternehmen – Strafbarkeitsrisiken nach 
den §§ 202a, 206 StGB, 2, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 68 (2010). 
2
  Cf. Valerian Jenny, in BDSG COMMENTARY GERMAN FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION ACT [BUN-
DESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ – BDSG], SEC. 88 OF THE GERMAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT [TELE-
KOMMUNIKATIONSGESETZ – TKG] margin no. 21 et seq. (Kai-Uwe Plath et al. eds., 1st ed. 2013). 
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tory document retention requirements. Electronic business communication may thus be 
subject to statutory document retention requirements.3 Emails that are deemed to be 
commercial letters must be archived pursuant to sec. 238 II HGB.4 If companies wish to 
meet these obligations, they must also be able to access emails stored on their systems. 
 
C. Requests from German authorities 
 
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for supervisory or prosecution authorities to ask 
companies to provide emails in order to investigate a particular matter. For example, 
requests may be made by public prosecutors, the German Federal Cartel Office [Bun-
deskartellamt] or the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority [Bundesanstalt 
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht]. There are often many reasons for companies to coop-
erate with the authorities if they receive such requests. However, companies can only 
provide such assistance in investigating matters if they can access business email com-
munication. 
 
D. Emails as evidence in court proceedings 
 
Electronic communication also plays an important role as evidence in court proceed-
ings.5 In dismissal protection or damages proceedings, for example, companies can often 
only prove that employees have breached their duties by presenting the relevant emails. 
The presentation of internal emails is often requested in cross-border legal disputes, in 
particular in e-discovery proceedings.6 For this purpose, too, access rights to employee 
email accounts are necessary. 
 
E. Detection of breaches of the law, legal duty to conduct investigations 
 
Criminal offences, regulatory offences or other compliance violations can frequently 			
3
  E.g. pursuant to sec. 238 II of the German Commercial Code [Handelsgesetzbuch – HGB], sec. 257 I HGB 
or sec. 147 I of the German Tax Code [Abgabenordnung – AO]. 
4
  Valerian Jenny (see footnote 2 above), sec. 88 TKG margin no. 21. 
5
  Cf. e.g. Stefan Sander, E-Mails und die Beweisführung im Prozess, 5 COMPUTER UND RECHT (CR) 292 
(2014) with further substantiation. 
6
  Cf. e.g. Axel Spies, in Betrieblicher Datenschutz 935 et seq. (Nikolaus Forgó et al eds., 2014); as well as Jan 
Kraayvanger/Mark C. Hilgard, Urkundenvorlegung im Zivilprozess – Annäherung an das amerikanische 
„discovery“-Verfahren?, NEUE JUSTIZ (NJ) 572 (2003); Stefan Hanloser, e-discovery, 12 DATENSCHUTZ UND 
DATENSICHERHEIT (DUD), 785 (2008); Johannes Lux/Tobias Glienke, US-Discovery versus deutsches Da-
tenschutzrecht, 9 RIW 603 (2010); Klaus M. Brisch/Philip Laue, E-Discovery und Datenschutz, 1 RECHT 
DER DATENVERARBEITUNG (RDV) 1 (2010); Tim Wybitul, Interne Ermittlungen auf Aufforderung von 
US-Behörden – ein Erfahrungsbericht, 12 BETRIEBS-BERATER (BB) 606 (2009); TIDO PARK, MÜNCHENER 
ANWALTSHANDBUCH VERTEIDIGUNG IN WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFSACHEN, 438 et seq. (Klaus 
Volk, 2nd ed., 2014). 
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only be detected or proven by monitoring emails. Secs. 30 and 130 of the German Regu-
latory Offences Act [Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz – OWiG] set out extensive supervisory 
duties for companies. These provisions ultimately give rise to a legal duty to conduct 
internal investigations if there are suspicions pointing to possible breaches of the law. 
The so-called principle of legality also constitutes a further legal basis of the requirement 
to investigate matters that point to a breach of the provisions of the German Criminal 
Code [Strafgesetzbuch – StGB] or the OWiG. The District Court [Landgericht – LG] of 
Munich I only recently confirmed in a high-profile judgment that members of the man-
agement board must, as part of their legality duty, ensure that the company is organised 
and supervised in such a way that no breaches of the law occur7. Companies only meet 
these supervisory requirements if they can also carry out monitoring of business email 
communication in the case of appropriate indications.  
 
II. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INSPECTION OF EMAILS 
 
   Substantial legal requirements apply to the analysis or monitoring of business email 
accounts.8 In all cases, companies must comply with the strict requirements of the 
BDSG. As a rule, the proportionality principle that must be safeguarded in this respect 
requires a comprehensive weighing up of the interests of the employees affected by the 
monitoring of emails against the purpose of the monitoring pursued by the company.9 
The economic interests of the company on the one hand, and the general right to priva-
cy of the persons affected by the inspection or analysis of their emails on the other, must 
be weighed against each other. 
 
As there are not yet any court rulings setting out clear and generally valid requirements 
for the inspection and analysis of email accounts, monitoring emails often entails signifi-
cant legal risks. If mistakes are made in the legal assessment of the permissibility of mon-
			
7
  So-called "Neubürger decision", District Court of Munich I, NZG 2014, 345 (not res judicata; appeal filed 
with the Munich Court of Appeals [Oberlandesgericht – OLG] pending under 7 U 113/14); cf. also Spieß, 
CCZ 2014, 143; Meyer, DB 2014, 1063; Holger Fleischer, Aktienrechtliche Compliance-Pflichten im Prax-
istest: Das Siemens/Neubürger-Urteil des LG München, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
(NZG) 321 (2014). 
8
  Cf. e.g. Markus Rübenstahl & Stefanie Debus, Strafbarkeit verdachtsabhängiger E-Mail- und EDV-
Kontrollen bei Internal Investigations, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTER-
NEHMENSSTRAFRECHT (NZWIST) 69 (2012), or Tim Wybitul, Neue Spielregeln bei E-Mail-Kontrollen 
durch den Arbeitgeber, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DATENSCHUTZ (ZD) 69 (2011). 
9
  Cf. Martin Kock & Julia Franke, Mitarbeiterkontrolle durch systematischen Datenabgleich zur Korruptions-
bekämpfung, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT (NZA) 646, 648 (2009); Wybitul in Knie-
rim/Rübenstahl/Tsambikakis, Internal Investigations, 2013, 294. 
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itoring measures, employers face risks of criminal liability,10 fines,11 prohibitions on using 
evidence with regard to the information collected,12 claims for damages asserted by per-
sons affected by the inspection of their emails, massive reputational damage due to nega-
tive reporting in the media and a number of other disadvantages. 
 
A. Monitoring business emails if private use is prohibited 
 
From a legal perspective, it can only be advised that companies prohibit the private use 
of business email accounts.13 This is because the permissibility and limits of email moni-
toring depend heavily on whether the employer allows the private use of the corporate 
IT system. If the employer prohibits its employees from the private use of business 
email accounts, it has extremely extensive options with regard to monitoring and super-
vision. It can then, as a rule, access electronic communication in the company. If private 
use is prohibited, emails on company servers are treated similarly to business letters.14 In 
this case, access to email accounts is governed by the general requirements of data pro-
tection, e.g. in the form of sec. 32 I 1 or 2 BDSG.15 Ultimately, the employer must weigh 
up its own interest in monitoring emails against the right of those affected to informa-
tional self-determination.16 
 
B. General prohibition on monitoring emails if private use is permitted? 
 
As managing a comprehensive prohibition on private use is not possible in practice, 
most companies in Germany permit their employees to send and receive private emails 
via their business account.17 This approach leads to considerable problems that are de-
scribed in detail below. 
 			
10
  E.g. pursuant to sec. 44 BDSG or pursuant to sec. 206 I StGB (disputed), cf. also sec. 202 a StGB. 
11
  In particular pursuant to sec. 43 II no. 1 BDSG. 
12
  Cf. e.g. BAG, NZA 2014, 143; ZD 2014, 260; or Stefan Brink/Tim Wybitul, Der “neue Datenschutz” des 
BAG, ZD 225 (2014) on the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in breach of data protection regulations in 
civil proceedings. 
13
  E.g. also Riesenhuber, § 32, in Beck Online Kommentar BDSG margin no. 146 (Heinrich Amadeus Wolff et 
al eds., 4th ed. 2013). 
14
  Cf. e.g. GREGOR THÜSING, BESCHÄFTIGTENDATENSCHUTZ UND COMPLIANCE margin no. 48 et seq. 
(2nd ed., 2014); Katrin Stamer & Michael Kuhnke in Plath (footnote 2 above), § 32 margin no. 78. 
15
  Likewise Stamer/Kuhnke in Plath (footnote 2 above), § 32 margin no. 81. 
16
  Cf. Regional Labour Court [Landesarbeitsgericht – LAG] of Hamm, judgment of 10 July 2012 – 14 Sa 
1711/10, BeckRS 2012, 71605; CCZ 2013, 115 with comments by Heinemeyer, CCZ 2013, 116. 
17
  E.g. also Stamer/Kuhnke, in Plath (footnote 2 above), § 32 margin no. 79 or Martin Munz, sec. 88 TKG, 
Kommentar zum BDSG margin no. 21 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
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a) If private use is permitted, are employers subject to telecommunications secrecy? If pri-
vate use is not explicitly prohibited, the question arises of whether the employer is a 
"provider of telecommunications services". The majority of the specialist literature to 
date views employers as providers of telecommunications services if they permit the 
private use of corporate email systems.18 As a result, telecommunications secrecy should 
also apply to the relationship between the employer and the employee in the case of 
business emails. Supporters of this view refer to the fact that telecommunications secre-
cy protects not only the content of a communication conducted by email, but also the 
detailed circumstances of the telecommunication process.19 The employer is, therefore, 
not allowed to access the emails of its employees that are stored on company servers. 
Otherwise, it breaches sec. 88 TKG and possibly also sec. 206 I StGB.20 Furthermore, the 
majority of the data protection supervisory authorities of the German federal states and 
the German federal government take this view.21 
 
According to this view in the specialist literature, the employer should therefore be 
barred from accessing all email correspondence of the employee.22 This is because, in 
order to distinguish between private and business emails, the employer must monitor 
individual emails and thereby commit a breach of telecommunications secrecy, which is 
subject to a penalty.23 This view presents excessive hurdles for companies and is heavily 
criticised in some cases due to its practical consequences.24 
 			
18
  Cf. e.g. Achim Seifert, § 32, in BDSG margin no. 90 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Peter Gola/Christoph 
Klug/Barbara Körffer, § 32, in BDSG margin no. 18 (Peter Gola & Rudolf Schomerus, 11th ed. 2012); Ines 
M. Hassemer, Strafrechtliche Folgen des Verstoßes gegen Beschäftigtendatenschutz, in Daten- und 
Persönlichkeitsschutz im Arbeitsverhältnis 549, 571 margin no. 91 (Stephan Weth et al eds., 2014); Theodor 
Lenckner & Jörg Eisele, § 206, in StGB Kommentar margin no. 8 (Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder, 28th 
ed. 2010); Peter Gola, Neuer Tele-Datenschutz für Arbeitnehmer? Die Anwendung von TKG und TDDSG 
im Arbeitsverhältnis, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT (MMR) 322 (1999); Mengel, Kontrolle der Telekommu-
nikation am Arbeitsplatz, BETRIEBS-BERATER (BB) 1445, 1449 et seq. (2004); Christian Oberwetter, Ar-
beitnehmerrechte bei Lidl, Aldi und Co., NZA 609, 610 et seq. (2008); René Hoppe & Frank Braun, Ar-
beitnehmer-E-Mails: Vertrauen ist gut – Kontrolle ist schlecht, MMR 80 (2010); ultimately similar Munz in 
Taeger/Gabel (footnote 17 above), § 88 TKG margin no. 23; BeckOK BDSG/Riesenhuber (footnote 13 
above), § 32 margin no. 144; Stamer/Kuhnke in Plath (footnote 2 above), § 32 margin no. 78 et seq. 
19
  Sec. 88 I 2 TKG. 
20
  Cf. e.g. Martin Munz (see footnote 17 above), sec. 88 TKG margin no. 20. 
21
  Cf. Martin Munz (see footnote 17 above), sec. 88 TKG margin no. 42. 
22
  E.g. Achim Seifert (see footnote 18 above), § 32 margin no. 92. 
23
  Ulrich Riesenhuber (see footnote 13 above), § 32 margin no. 148 describes this view, which is based on the 
mixing of business and private email communication, as a "scrambled egg theory". Cf. also Martin Munz (see 
footnote 17 above), sec. 88 TKG margin no. 20. 
24
  Cf. e.g. Ulrich Baumgartner, 363, 380, in Daten- und Persönlichkeitsschutz im Arbeitsverhältnis (Stephan 
Weth et al eds., 2012) 
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b) Opposing view: Employers must adhere to the requirements of the BDSG. In the more 
recent specialist literature, the view is frequently expressed that employers are not tele-
communications providers even if they allow their employees private use of business 
email accounts.25 There are better arguments in favour of this view than for a rigid ap-
plication of telecommunications secrecy and a resulting absolute prohibition on moni-
toring.26 
 
The currently prevailing view in the literature regards employers as telecommunications 
service providers, in particular due to the highly indeterminate wording of sec. 3 TKG.27 
However, one of the arguments against this interpretation is that unclearly formulated 
provisions must initially be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the constitu-
tion. With regard to the question of the permissibility of accessing emails on company 
servers, the opposing interests of the employer 28 and the employee29 can only be recon-
ciled in a manner that is consistent with fundamental rights by way of practical con-
cordance.30 However, this can only be done by weighing up the interests concerned and 
not on the basis of a strict prohibition on access as stipulated by telecommunications 
secrecy. 
 
Even if telecommunications secrecy does not apply, the right of users of business email 
accounts to informational self-determination is protected comprehensively by the 
BDSG as well as the review of proportionality to be conducted pursuant thereto.31 Ac-
cess to business email accounts is governed in particular by the data protection provi-
sions under sec. 32 I 1 or sentence 2 BDSG. 
 
C. Practical significance of the possible applicability of telecommunications se-
crecy 
 
The dispute about the question of the scope of application of sec. 88 TKG is extremely 
important for companies. The decisive factor in this respect is what legal consequences 
could arise from accessing an employee's business emails. Ultimately, it is therefore a 			
25
  Cf. in respect of this conflict of opinions Gregor Thüsing (see footnote 14 above), margin no. 74 et seq. 
26
  Cf. e.g. Gregor Thüsing (see footnote 14 above), margin no. 74 et seq.; Ulrich Baumgartner, in (see footnote 
18 above), 363, 380; Tim Wybitul, Neue Spielregeln bei E-Mail-Kontrollen durch den Arbeitgeber, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DATENSCHUTZ, 69 (2011). 
27
  Within the meaning of sec. 3 no. 6 TKG. 
28
  E.g. art. 2 I, art. 12 I, art. 14 I of the German Basic Law [Grundgesetz – GG]. 
29
  E.g. art. 2 I in conjunction with art. 1 I GG, art. 10 I GG. 
30
  As rightly stated by Gregor Thüsing (see footnote 14 above), margin no. 91. 
31
  As ultimately also stated in Ulrich Riesenhuber (see footnote 13 above), sec. 32 margin no. 146 on prohibited 
private use. 
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matter of assessing the legal consequences or of analysing the possible consequences of 
accessing electronic communication in a company. To do so, it is not only important to 
be familiar with the legal opinions outlined above. Rather, above all the decisive factor 
for practitioners is how courts assess the question of the possible applicability of tele-
communications secrecy. 
 
D. Requirements laid down by court rulings on monitoring emails if private use is 
permitted 
 
To date, there have been no rulings of the highest court instances on the question of 
whether employers that permit private email use are subject to telecommunications 
secrecy.32 However, in 2010 the Regional Labor Court of Lower Saxony33 and in 2011 the 
Regional Labor Court of Berlin-Brandenburg34 addressed the question of whether such 
employers must be treated as telecommunications providers. The result of both deci-
sions is clear: the judges did not deem the employers concerned to be providers of tele-
communications services. Consequently, employers must not take into account tele-
communications secrecy in the case of their employees' business emails.35 The more re-
cent judgments of German courts outlined below are also along these lines. 
 
a) Regional Labor Court of Hamm. Helpful guidance is contained in the judgment of 
the Regional Labor Court of Hamm of 10 July 2012,36 which concerns the permissibility 
of the use of chat records in dismissal protection proceedings. In the case of dismissal 
due to serious breaches of duty, the court granted the employer very extensive options 
for monitoring the electronic resources provided. In contrast to the private use of busi-
ness email accounts, there are a number of reasons in favor of the applicability of tele-
communications secrecy with regard to the use of chat providers on a workstation. The 
judges ultimately left open whether the employer must be regarded as a "service provid-
er" within the meaning of the TKG in respect of chatting on the workstation. Neverthe-
less, they granted the company highly extensive monitoring options because the compa-
ny had previously stated in corresponding guidelines that employees must not expect 
any confidentiality when using the corporate IT systems: 
 
This can also be applied to accessing business email communication. In its decision, the 
Regional Labor Court of Hamm expressly found that the treatment of chat records 			
32
  As also stated by Martin Munz (see footnote 17 above), sec. 8 TKG margin no. 20. 
33
  Regional Labor Court of Lower Saxony, NZA-RR 2010, 406. 
34
  Regional Labor Court of Berlin-Brandenburg, NZA-RR 2011, 342. 
35
  Cf. Ulrich Fülbier & Andreas Splittgerber, Keine (Fernmelde-) Geheimnisse vor dem Arbeitgeber?, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1995 (2012). 
36
  Regional Labor Court of Hamm, judgment of 10 July 2012 – 14 Sa 1711/10, BeckRS 2012, 71605. 
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must, as a rule, follow the legal treatment of emails.37  
 
The fact that the Regional Labor Court of Hamm found in favor of the employer in its 
weighing up of interests, above all due to the corresponding guidelines, underlines that 
employers are well advised to retain extensive control and monitoring rights with regard 
to the IT infrastructure provided. An ever growing number of employers are respond-
ing to the more recent court rulings by revising their policy on the use of the Internet 
and email systems in the company. In this respect, companies should specifically state 
what use of corporate email systems is permitted and what is not. If the employer wants 
to ensure that emails can be used in subsequent court proceedings, it should primarily 
inform its employees of what monitoring measures they must expect and under what 
circumstances emails will be monitored by issuing corresponding guidelines. This is 
because the German Federal Labor Court [Bundesarbeitsgericht – BAG] is increasingly 
adopting the approach of not using evidence that has been collected behind the backs of 
employees.38 Against this background, employers can only be advised to create a high 
degree of transparency. 
b) Administrative Court [Verwaltungsgericht – VG] of Karlsruhe. The Administrative 
Court of Karlsruhe also expresses a clear view on the question of whether employers that 
permit the private use of business email accounts must be regarded as service providers 
within the meaning of the TKG:39 
 
"The plaintiff invokes the provision under sec. 88 TKG entitled "telecommunications 
secrecy". Pursuant to sec. 88 I 1 TKG, telecommunications secrecy applies to the content 
of the telecommunication and its detailed circumstances, in particular whether someone 
is or was involved in a telecommunications process. Pursuant to sec. 88 II 1 TKG, every 
service provider is obliged to safeguard telecommunications secrecy. (...) 
 
Even if private use is assumed to be permitted, the legislative purpose of the TKG pre-
vents any use of sec. 88 TKG. Sec. 1 TKG indicates that the Act aims to promote private 
competition in the area of telecommunication, therefore that it is geared towards the 
legal relationships between the state and telecommunications providers as well as those 
between telecommunications providers. However, the spirit and purpose of the Act is 
not to govern internal legal relationships – e.g. between employer and employee – with-
in companies or authorities."40 
 			
37
  Regional Labor Court of Hamm, judgment of 10 July 2012 – 14 Sa 1711/10, BeckRS 2012, 71605 margin no. 
179. 
38
  E.g. German Federal Labor Court, NZA 2014, 143; ZD 2014, 260 or NJW 2014, 810. 
39
  Administrative Court of Karlsruhe, NVwZ-RR 2013, 797 margin no. 65. 
40
  Emphasis by the author. 
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The Administrative Court of Karlsruhe thus arrives at the same conclusion as the Re-
gional Labor Court of Lower Saxony and the Regional Labor Court of Berlin-
Brandenburg. Here, too, the judges correctly reject any applicability of telecommunica-
tions secrecy in the employment relationship. 
 
Furthermore, the decision clearly shows that, even without telecommunications secrecy, 
the right to privacy of those affected by the analysis of their data is protected quite effec-
tively because the administrative judges essentially found in favor of the plaintiff to the 
extent that his personal data was not permitted to be used any further. They justified 
this conclusion on the basis of the data protection provisions applicable to the case de-
cided on.41 
 
c) Regional Labor Court of Hesse. The Regional Labor Court of Hesse42, too, assesses in a 
similar manner the question of whether employers are providers of telecommunications 
services. The case in question related to the summary dismissal of an account manager 
for deleting business emails, customer contacts and customer appointments of the em-
ployer. In the dismissal protection proceedings, the employee submitted that he 
 
"was able to freely dispose of his Outlook account and also used it to save and send pri-
vate data. (...). Any knowledge regarding the plaintiff's behavior with respect to this data 
should not be used in the collection of evidence as this violates the plaintiff's general 
right to privacy." 
 
This line of argument pursued by the plaintiff is consistent with the view outlined 
above that the employer is not permitted to access emails on company servers if it allows 
or tolerates the private use of email accounts. 
 
The employer took a different view. After corresponding suspicions had arisen, it asked 
an expert to prepare an expert opinion in order to establish whether and which emails 
and other data had been deleted by the account manager. If the Regional Labor Court of 
Hesse had actually deemed the employer's actions as a violation of telecommunications 
secrecy due to the allegedly permitted private use of the email account, it would not have 
been allowed to use the expert opinion in the subsequent court proceedings. However, 
the Regional Labor Court of Hesse did not deem that it was prevented from using the 
expert opinion. Ultimately, the judges thus clearly rejected the restrictive view in the 
specialist literature. In the grounds for the judgment, the judges stated in this respect: 			
41
  In particular on the basis of sec. 15 IV of the State Data Protection Act of Baden-Württemberg 
[Landesdatenschutzgesetz Baden-Württemberg – DSG BW]. 
42
  Regional Labor Court of Hesse, judgment of 5 August 2013 – 7 Sa 1060/10, BeckRS 2013, 75084; ZD 2014, 
377 with comments by Thorsten Sörup, Außerordentliche Kündigung - Datenlöschung - Urlaubsanspruch - 
unzulässige Verweisung auf einzelne Tarifbestimmungen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DATENSCHUTZ, 378 (2014).  
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"Nor is the court prevented from using the result of the taking of evidence determined 
by the expert opinion, although the analysis of the hard drive submitted to the expert 
revealed that private emails and private contact addresses were also among the files delet-
ed by the plaintiff. 
 
Given that the computer was provided to the plaintiff as a work tool and the plaintiff 
used it to process and store a considerable volume of data that he required to perform 
his duties under his employment contract, the fact that private files of the plaintiff also 
became known by name during the taking of evidence constitutes such a minor intru-
sion into his privacy that this does not lead to a prohibition on the use of evidence, and 
therefore the question of whether the plaintiff was at all permitted to use the defend-
ant's computer for private purposes does not need to be addressed any further." 
 
If the Regional Labor Court of Hesse had assumed the possible applicability of telecom-
munications secrecy in the case described, it would have had to justify why it used the 
data in question despite the employer violating sec. 88 TKG and possibly also sec. 206 I 
StGB. Instead, the judges even clarify in the cited decision that telecommunications 
secrecy or other restrictions on data use by employers are not applicable in the core area 
of the employment relationship – regardless of the question of whether the company 
allows the private use of corporate IT systems. 
 
 
E. Consequences for companies 
 
As a result, it can be stated that, according to the correct view, telecommunications se-
crecy does not prevent business email communication from being monitored and ana-
lyzed. In fact, employers must adhere to the strict requirements of data protection law. 
The employer can take into account the general right to privacy of the employee con-
cerned by informing its employees of the possible monitoring of email inboxes (e.g. in a 
works agreement or IT guidelines) and precisely specifying the conditions for monitor-
ing. Furthermore, employers should only permit the private use of email accounts if 
employees have consented to any monitoring. 
 
III. CHECKLIST: DATA PROTECTION IN THE CASE OF EMAIL ANALYSIS 
 
The following checklist provides guidance on how to analyze and inspect business 
emails in accordance with data protection provisions. It does not replace the respective 
review of data protection requirements in the individual case. In cases of doubt, the 
company must always perform a review of permissibility based on the circumstances of 
the respective inspection of emails and the content of the communication concerned. 
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A. Preparation for the analysis 
 
Companies should always carefully prepare for the monitoring of emails and establish in 
good time conditions that enable the electronic communication required to realize the 
specifically pursued purpose of the monitoring to be inspected in accordance with data 
protection provisions. 
 
a) Review and, if necessary, amendment of existing IT rules. Corporate rules on email 
use often have a huge influence on the permissibility of analyzing email accounts. As 
already stated, more detailed monitoring is possible in principle if the employer has 
prohibited the private use of business email accounts or the users concerned have con-
sented to monitoring. The decisive factor here is whether users are entitled to legitimate-
ly expect that email communication is not monitored. In such cases, only restricted ac-
cess to electronic communication is usually allowed. The corresponding corporate rules 
on email use can thus have a major effect on the review of proportionality that is neces-
sary for the specific analysis. 
 
b) Composition of the investigation team. The group of persons with access to personal 
data for the purpose of analyzing emails should be restricted to the minimum needed to 
effectively investigate the matter. The company should clearly define duties and areas of 
responsibility. The "need to know" principle applies. 
 
c) Training the investigation team. Extensive knowledge of data protection law is re-
quired in order to inspect emails in compliance with data protection provisions. Other-
wise, there is, among other things, the risk of criminal liability and fines, of the infor-
mation and evidence obtained being unusable and considerable reputational damage. 
Therefore, all members of the investigation team should be trained in the key data pro-
tection requirements. 
 
d) Obligation to maintain data secrecy. All parties involved in the inspection must be 
comprehensively obliged to maintain data secrecy pursuant to sec. 5 BDSG and in-
formed of the possible consequences of data protection violations. In particular, the 
company should also provide information on the risks of fines and criminal liability 
pursuant to secs. 43, 44 BDSG as well as secs. 201 et seq. StGB. 
 
e) Involvement of data protection experts. As far as possible, an experienced data protec-
tion expert should attend each email inspection in order to address questions relating to 
the individual case. In all cases, this expert must be highly familiar with the aforemen-
tioned relevant court rulings on email inspections and on employee data protection. 
 
f) Involvement of the data protection officer. The company's data protection officer 
should be involved in each phase of the email inspection. If possible, the data protection 
officer should perform a prior check of the specifically planned measures before the 
email inspection. 
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g) If necessary, take into account co-determination rights of the works council. As a rule, 
the works council has a co-determination right in respect of email inspections pursuant 
to sec. 87 I no. 6 of the German Works Constitution Act [Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – 
BetrVG]. If the employer disregards this co-determination right, the works council may 
very quickly obtain a cease and desist order preventing the email inspection from being 
carried out any further. In addition, sec. 80 I no. 1 BetrVG affords the works council 
extensive information rights with regard to data protection issues. In practice, the con-
clusion of corresponding works agreements has proven itself as a suitable way to create 
legal certainty.43 
 
h) IT infrastructures. Technical requirements, in particular relating to documentation as 
well as to data backup and data analysis, are also important. There is a wide range of 
software solutions for inspecting emails.44 Corresponding contractual agreements must 
be concluded with the providers of forensic software and services. In this respect, it must 
also be examined whether these provisions can be structured as commissioned data pro-
cessing contracts within the meaning of sec. 11 BDSG. At the same time, the company 
should also carefully check whether the respective contracts offered by the providers 
meet the relevant legal requirements, cf. in particular sec. 11 II–V BDSG. 
 
i) Data security. Pursuant to sec. 9 BDSG, a high degree of data security is stipulated in 
the case of email analysis in particular. This applies especially to entry, access and disclo-
sure controls. It is imperative that these controls guarantee that information from the 
email inspection does not become known to any unauthorized parties. In particular, the 
use of USB sticks and other mobile data carriers must be effectively prohibited. 
 
B. Legal framework 
 
In view of the strict requirements for the lawful monitoring of internal electronic com-
munication and the possible serious consequences of data protection errors, companies 
should carefully ensure that they also implement the measures specified below in order 
to create a sufficient legal framework. 
 
a) General permissibility of the planned email inspection. Are there reliable statements 
on the general permissibility of the intended inspection of electronic communication? 
These could be, in particular, statements by the supervisory authorities for data protec-
tion as well as legal expert opinions by data protection experts. 
 			
43
  Cf. BAG, NZA 2014, 551. 
44
  E.g. Concordance, CT Summation, Kroll Ontrak, Forensic Toolkit. 
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b) Possible involvement of the data protection authority. One of the safest ways to reliably 
rule out subsequent legal risks is to liaise with the competent supervisory authority for 
data protection. If the timeframe of an investigation permits this course of action, com-
panies should certainly examine whether liaising with the data protection authority is 
possible and expedient in the specific individual case. 
 
c) Data backup. The persons involved in the analysis should only inspect data that is 
saved in forensic backup copies. Intrusion into ongoing email correspondence must be 
avoided as a matter of urgency. In particular, it should be ensured that, in the course of 
the inspection of emails, no changes are made to metadata on the company's email serv-
ers. Otherwise, the subsequent evidentiary value of the inspected emails could be signifi-
cantly reduced. 
 
d) Instructions for the investigation team. The persons involved in the analysis should 
not read emails that are obviously private or stop inspecting private correspondence if 
they have already started to do so. 
 
e) Informing the persons affected. The persons affected by the inspection of their busi-
ness email correspondence should be informed as early as possible of the analysis of their 
electronic communication. In particular with regard to email inspections, German data 
protection law requires a high degree of transparency when handling personal data 
(sec. 4 II and III as well as secs. 33 et seq. BDSG).45 It is often possible to inform the per-
sons affected of the intended inspection of their emails after the mirroring of emails in 
order to create a forensic backup copy. The situation is different if there are specific 
indications that, otherwise, the objective of the investigation could be endangered, e.g. 
by wiping away traces. 
 
C. Implementation of the email inspection 
 
The actual inspection of the electronic communication that is decisive in order to realize 
the respective purpose of the monitoring is also subject to substantial requirements 
under data protection law. 
 
a) Confidentiality. Any internal disclosure of the results of an email inspection should 
be restricted to the absolute minimum required. Any prejudgment or stigmatization of 
the persons affected by the investigation of the matter must be avoided. 
 
b) Narrowing down the group of persons affected. The group of persons affected by the 
analysis of their emails must be strictly limited to those required to realize the objective 			
45
  Cf. BAG, NZA 2014, 143. 
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of the monitoring. If a user has no connection to the purpose being pursued by the 
inspection of the emails, his business email account should not be accessed. 
 
c) Narrowing down the email inspection. The email inspection should be strictly limited 
to the communication that is relevant for the matter in question, e.g. by being narrowed 
down to specific periods, business transactions, questionable payments, contractual 
relationships or agreements, business partners, other persons involved. 
 
d) Weighing up of interests in the individual case. When examining the matter from the 
perspective of data protection law, it is necessary to weigh up the specific interest of the 
company in conducting an investigation and the right of the persons affected by the 
inspection of their emails to the protection of their informational self-determination. If 
the protection-worthy interest of the person affected by the inspection of his data in the 
preclusion of the analysis of his emails outweighs the other factors, the inspection must 
not be carried out. 
 
When weighing up these interests – the realization of the objective of the investigation 
versus the right of the persons affected to informational self-determination – all the 
circumstances of the respective case and of the individual email communication must be 
taken into account. As a rule, this review of proportionality in the individual case46 re-
quires considerable prior knowledge of data protection law. 
 
In particular, the respective reader of the email must assess whether the inspection of 
this specific electronic communication is at all suitable for investigating the matter in 
question, whether there are milder means of realizing the objective of the investigation 
just as effectively and whether the inspection is reasonable, i.e. can be conducted on the 
basis of an appropriate weighing up of the interests of the persons affected and those of 
the company. 
 
If the inspection of an email is clearly unable to realize the objective of the investigation, 
it is not suitable and therefore not permissible. For this reason, emails that are obviously 
of an exclusively private nature may not be inspected, for example. Furthermore, the 
inspection of the emails in question must always be the mildest of all equally effective 
means that are available in order to investigate the matter. This requirement must be 
ensured in every phase of the investigation of the matter. In particular, according to the 
court rulings, the highest possible degree of transparency vis-à-vis the employees affected 
by the analysis of their emails must be ensured. 
 			
46
  Cf. in detail in respect of the three-stage review standard Oliver Zöll (see footnote 17 above), sec. 32 BDSG 
margin no. 18; Tim Wybitul, Wie viel Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz ist “erforderlich”?, BETRIEBSBERATER, 
1085 (2010); TIM WYBITUL, HDB DATENSCHUTZ IM UNTERNEHMEN 175 et seq. (2nd ed., 2014). 
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Even if the inspection of an email is suitable for realizing the purpose of the investiga-
tion or monitoring and constitutes the mildest of all equally effective means, this han-
dling of personal data must always be proportionate in the narrower sense. An email 
inspection is appropriate if legitimate interests of the persons involved in the electronic 
communication do not outweigh the company's interest in conducting the investiga-
tion. In particular, any email inspection that concerns the core area of the affected per-
sons' private lives, e.g. emails of an intimate nature, is prohibited. 
 
e) Review of emails that are problematic from the perspective of data protection law. In 
practice, it has proved worthwhile for the person involved in the analysis to designate 
emails that he deems to be problematic from the perspective of data protection law. 
These emails should only be inspected later after a detailed review of the permissibility 
of the analysis under data protection law – or if other suspicions indicate that precisely 
the email communication in question is decisive for the specific purpose of the investi-
gation or monitoring. The assessment of individual emails under data protection law 
often also changes in the course of the respective investigation because the investigators 
obtain further information. 
 
f) Graduated approach. As far as possible, the actual inspection should initially focus on 
random samples instead of a uniform and complete check. Equally, analyses must always 
relate strictly to the respective objective of the investigation. 
 
D. Documentation of the email inspection 
 
Compliance with the above points should be documented comprehensively for eviden-
tiary reasons and in order to avoid considerable disadvantages (up to and including risks 
of criminal liability). In particular, the points below should be clearly recorded. 
As a rule, such documentation is not prepared in writing, but in electronic form. Com-
mercial software solutions that help companies inspect emails usually have correspond-
ing functions for preparing records of email inspections. 
 
a) Specific purposes of the email inspection. Above all, the company should very clearly 
set out the purposes being pursued by the respective email inspection. This can make it 
much easier for the company's data protection officer to review the permissibility of the 
planned measures. 
 
b) Description of the individual steps in the investigation. The company should systemat-
ically and clearly determine the individual phases of the respective measures designed to 
investigate the matter. 
 
c) Search criteria used. The company should record the parameters used to select the 
electronic communication actually inspected. 
 
d) Email accounts affected. Which accounts were inspected, which periods were affected 
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by the monitoring of emails? 
 
e) Emails discovered that are relevant to the matter. Finally, the company should docu-
ment which emails it deems relevant for the matter in question. In addition, it should 
also record the conclusions to be drawn from these emails for the further investigation 
of the matter. 
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 
 
Complex requirements apply to the monitoring of business email accounts. Considera-
ble risks could arise from violations of the law, up to and including possible criminal 
liability pursuant to sec. 206 I StGB or secs. 44 I, 43 II BDSG.47 If the recommendations 
specified in the above checklist are taken into account, these risks can be significantly 
reduced or even ruled out. Moreover, companies should review and, if necessary, thor-
oughly revise existing usage rules or works agreements relating to the handling of emails 
within the company. 
 
A. Approach if private use is prohibited 
 
If companies wish to access their employees' business emails in a legally secure manner, 
they should, if possible, prohibit the private use of company accounts. In this case, elec-
tronic communication in the company is treated similarly to business letters. As the 
right to privacy of the employees concerned is usually only affected to a minor extent in 
such cases, the weighing up of interests will mostly favor the employer. However, in this 
case, too, the employer should clarify as a matter of urgency which monitoring measures 
it reserves the right to implement. 
 
B. Approach if private use is permitted 
 
In practice, it is often not expedient to prohibit the private use of business emails in 
many cases. According to the view taken by most supervisory authorities for data pro-
tection and probably still the majority of the specialist literature, risks of criminal liabil-
ity can be ruled out in the case of email monitoring due to sec. 206 I StGB at most by 
carefully drafted provisions on the use of corporate email systems.48 In these cases, em-
ployers should only allow private use by those employees who have consented to appro-
priate monitoring of their electronic communication. 			
47
  Cf. e.g. BGHSt 58, 268 = NJW 2013, 2530 with comments by Tim Wybitul, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
DATENSCHUTZ, 509 (2013). 
48
  As also stated by Michael Walther & Mark Zimmer, Mehr Rechtssicherheit für Compliance Ermittlungen, 
BETRIEBS-BERATER, 2933, 2937 (2013). 
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The company can certainly instruct employees not to store sensitive or intimate content 
on corporate IT systems by issuing guidelines or works agreements. It can also order 
employees not to use company computers for any content that the employer is not sup-
posed to monitor. If employees store private content despite this prohibition, it must be 
clear to them that they cannot invoke the fact that they expected the company not to 
access their data. This applies in particular if the employer expressly reserves the right to 
make random checks or to implement monitoring if there is a firm suspicion of breaches 
of duty. 
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   Data is everywhere. The volume, variety and velocity of data coming into companies 
have reached unprecedented levels. It is estimated that around 5 exabytes (= 5 billion 
gigabytes) of data are created each day, and this number is doubling roughly every 2 
years.1 Due to the sheer amount, companies do not know which potential compliance 
risks are “hidden” in the data. Companies are also confronted with more regulations, 
tightened enforcement and heightened global competition. This gives rise to new chal-
lenges for an effective compliance framework. However, surveys indicate that compa-
nies (depending on the industry and size) are relatively slow to adopt modern technolo-
gies to address these challenges. Law firms and lawyers are also reluctant when it comes 
to modern data analytics. 
 
The only way to proactively or reactively investigate or prevent compliance issues in an 
era of data is to understand complex data sets from multiple sources within a company. 
In other industries, data analytics2 is frequently used to uncover hidden patterns, un-
known correlations and other useful information. Using data analytics, data scientists 
and others can analyze huge volumes of data that conventional analytics and business 
intelligence solutions can't touch. The emerging field of “Compliance Tech” tries to 
utilize data analytics in conjunction with subject matter professionals to bring compli-
ance detection and prevention into the 21th century. Compliance Tech is used to proac-
tively seek opportunities to detect and prevent fraud, waste and abuse to ensure compli-
ant behavior. Compliance Tech aims to make the invisible visible. Compliance Tech 
provides the toolset to spot patterns or trends in data that are invisible to the naked eye. 
This is achieved by using different techniques (which will be explained later in greater 
detail) which helps to retrieve, organize, structure and streamline data to make invisible 
patterns become visible.  
 
Compliance Tech brings compliance investigation or prevention to a new level. It allows 
for anomaly detection, clustering and risk ranking through a statistical-based analysis. 
This approach ensures better results compared to a “traditional” rule-based approach 
(matching, grouping, ordering, jointing and filtering etc.) when deployed over large data 
sets. Data visualization and test mining are, for example, superior to traditional keyword 
searching. Without these tools, companies remain dependent on human identification 
of risks and violations, whether flagged by employees, hotline tips, whistle-blowers or 
government auditors. Their compliance efforts often consist only of training employees 
to spot misconduct, and in setting aside financial reserves to fund expensive, after-the-
fact investigations by outside counsel. 
 
This article seeks to present the technologies, methodologies, processes and practices 			
1 Cf. VINCENZO MORABITO, BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS 105 (2015). 
2
 THOMAS A. RUNKLER, DATA ANALYTICS: MODELS AND ALGORITHMS FOR INTELLIGENT DATA ANAL-
YSIS (2015), provides a good introduction into this field.  
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behind Compliance Tech and will give practitioners, especially lawyers, a short overview 
of this rapidly emerging but still relatively unknown field. The article does not try to 
give a comprehensive overview of the subject but intends to familiarize compliance prac-
titioners with some of the fundamentals of data analytics. Compliance Tech forms part 
of a compliance program within a company. A compliance program will be defined here 
as an internal program and decision policy made by a company in order to meet the 
standards set by government laws and regulations.3 
 
Most of the technologies and methodologies deployed in Compliance Tech require big  
data4; a buzzword that describes a volume data so large that it is difficult to process 
using traditional database and software techniques.5 An important distinction to bear in 
mind is between structured and unstructured data.6 Structured data which is stored in 
precisely defined and described data fields. A typical example is a customer database in 
which each record consists of a name, address, birth date, etc. Structured data have a 
clear model and description and are therefore easily stored, processed and analyzed. 
Conversely, unstructured data do not have a precisely defined structure. This category 
may include images, videos, websites or content of e-mail and/or other communica-
tions. Unstructured data constitutes the absolute majority of generated data. 
 
There are many techniques that draw on disciplines such as statistics and computer sci-
ence (particularly machine learning) that can be used to analyze the structured and un-
structured datasets. The following non-exhaustive list entails the most commonly used 
techniques in Compliance Tech. Not all of these techniques strictly require the use of 
big data; some can be applied to effectively smaller datasets. The techniques and meth-
odologies are presented here in an order in which they would be typically used. Depend-
ing on the actual compliance framework required, different techniques may be used or 
combined to cater for the particular needs of a company. 
 
A common first step in deploying Compliance Tech is data  acquis it ion.7 This aims 
to ensure a stable transfer of internal and external data and convert the data into a for-
mat suitable for further analysis. Data  mapping serves as the initial step in data inte-			
3
  Cf. JULIA STEHMANN, COMPLIANCE-MANAGEMENT 6 ff. (2011). 
4
  VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANS-
FORM HOW LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013) gives a non-scientific overview of the opportunities and chal-
lenges of big data. 
5
  Cf. JAMES R. KALYVAS & MICHAEL R. OVERLY, BIG DATA: A BUSINESS AND LEGAL GUIDE 1 (2015); ANIL 
AGGARWAL, MANAGING BIG DATA INTEGRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 73 (2015).  
6
  Cf. MICHAEL BRACKETT, DATA RESOURCE DATA: A COMPREHENSIVE DATA RESOURCE UNDERSTAND-
ING 14 (2014). 
7
  MAURIZIO DI PAOLO EMILLIO, DATA ACQUISITIONS SYSTEMS (2013) gives a detailed introduction into 
this area. 
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gration.8 Data mapping is the process by which different data models are linked. This 
uses a defined set of methods to characterize the data in a specific definition. The tech-
nique involves evaluating data values in different data sources, as well as automatically 
and simultaneously discovering complex mappings between the sets. Data mapping is 
also used to consolidate multiple databases into a single database. 
 
Link analysis  is a technique used to evaluate the relationships or connections between 
various types of objects (nodes), including people, organizations and transactions.9 Link 
analysis is a kind of knowledge discovery that can be used to visualize data, allowing for 
better analysis, especially in the context of links (web links or relationship links). Link 
analysis might be able to detect or establish “hidden” relationships within a data set. 
 
Socia l  network analysis  (SNA) is the process of quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of a given social network. SNA measures and maps the flow of relationships (ties) and 
relationship changes between entities.10 Simple and complex entities (nodes) include 
websites, computers, animals, humans, groups, organizations and nations. Along with 
link analysis, SNA can, for example, help to identify related parties, conflict of interests, 
corruption and bid rigging. 
 
Text  mining is the analysis of data contained in natural language text.11 The applica-
tion of text mining techniques to solve business problems is called text analytics. Text 
analytics software can help by transposing words and phrases in unstructured data into 
numerical values which can then be linked with structured data in a database and ana-
lyzed with traditional data mining techniques. 
 
Data  mining is the process sorting through data to identify patterns and establish 
relationships.12 Data mining parameters include: 
 
  Association, i.e. identifying associations between events. 
  Sequence or path analysis, i.e. identifying patterns where one event leads to an-
other later event. 
  Classification is a set of techniques used to identify the categories in which new 
data points belong, based on a training set containing data points that have al-			
8
  Cf. QAMAR SHAHBAZ, DATA MAPPING FOR DATA WAREHOUSE DESIGN Chapter 3 (2015). 
9
  Cf. B. KIRWAN & L. K. AINSWORTH, A GUIDE TO TASK ANALYSIS 116 ff. (1992). 
10
  Cf. IAN MCCULLOH & HELEN ARMSTRONG, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS Intro-
duction (2013). 
11
  Cf. STÉPHANE TUFFÉRY, DATA MINING AND STATISTICS FOR DECISION MAKING 627 (2011). 
12
  Cf. STEPHAN KUDYBA & RICHARD HOPTROFF, DATA MINING AND BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE 
TO PRODUCTIVITY 37 (2001). 
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ready been categorized.13 
  Clustering is used to place data elements into related groups without advance 
knowledge of the group definitions.14 
 
Discovering patterns in data that can lead to reasonable predictions of future trends is 
known as predict ive  analyt ics .15 The central element of predictive analytics is the 
predictor, a variable that can be measured for an entity to predict future behavior. Mul-
tiple predictors are combined into a predictive model, which can be used to forecast 
future probabilities with an acceptable level of reliability. 
 
Data  v isual izat ion is a general term for tools which help to understand the signifi-
cance of a particular data set by placing it in a visual context.16 As a result of the visuali-
zation, patterns, trends and correlations can be exposed and recognized more easily. 
State-of-the-art data visualization software goes beyond the standard charts and graphs 
used in Excel. Data visualization entails more sophisticated tools such as infographics, 
dials and gauges, geographic maps, sparklines, heat maps, and detailed bar, pie and fever 
charts. One of the most widely used visual techniques is a tag cloud. A tag cloud is a 
stylized way of visually representing rates of occurrences of words used to described tags. 
The most popular topics are normally highlighted in a larger, bolder font. Data visuali-
zation helps us to absorb large pieces of information more efficiently. 
 
Combining the described methods significantly enhances the overall probability of de-
tecting and preventing compliance incidents within a company. Law practitioners 
should a have a good understanding of these methods to ensure the best results for their 
clients. However in practice, there might be several challenges to overcome if a company, 
compliance department or law firm decides to use Compliance Tech. 
 
One challenge with Compliance Tech is that companies or compliance teams need to 
understand how the tools work in practice. The challenge is to find the team with the 
right skillset. An ideal Compliance Tech team should be a combination of compliance 
experts with a legal background, and data scientists. All team members should be capa-
ble of working both with new technologies, and interpreting data to find meaningful 
compliance insights. However, in reality, members of compliance teams normally only 			
13
  Cf. THOMAS A. RUNKLER, DATA ANALYTICS: MODELS AND ALGORITHMS FOR INTELLIGENT DATA 
ANALYSIS 85 (2015). 
14
  Cf. THOMAS A. RUNKLER, DATA ANALYTICS: MODELS AND ALGORITHMS FOR INTELLIGENT DATA 
ANALYSIS 103 ff. (2015). 
15
  COLLEEN MCCUE, DATA MINING AND PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (2014); DEAN ABBOTT, APPLIED PREDIC-
TIVE ANALYTICS (2014), give a good overview over the techniques used in predictive analytics. 
16
  Cf. Evan F. Sinar, Chapter 5 (Data Visualization), in Big Data at Work 115 (Scott Tonidandel et al eds., 2015). 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 1   2016 
MICHA-MANUEL BUES  |  COMPLIANCE TECH 
PAGE  83 
have a legal or non-tech background. Without proper training, they tend to have prob-
lems understanding the underlying concepts and methodologies of Compliance Tech. It 
is then difficult to effectively supervise the data analytic process and to apply the right 
technology architecture and capabilities. This expertise could either be built in-house, or 
outsourced to a third party IT partner. As the technology landscape in the data world is 
evolving extremely fast it could be helpful to work with a strong and innovative tech-
nology partner who can help create the right IT architecture to efficiently adapt to 
changes in the landscape. 
 
In addition, any introduction of Compliance Tech should be accompanied with a 
change management approach that includes an extensive communication effort. Many 
companies fail to recognize that new analytics often requires new behaviors.17 For this 
reason, communication plays an essential role to educate, inform and explain a Compli-
ance Tech approach within a company or legal department. Personal experience has 
shown that it takes a considerable amount of time to introduce the concepts of Compli-
ance Tech and their benefits to employees, business stakeholders, management and IT 
teams. The management must be willing to change in order for the data and models to 
yield better compliance decisions.18 
 
In addition, it is important to find the right applications for Compliance Tech. Some-
times companies are lured into thinking that running analytics on a very large set of data 
is data analytics. But data analytics only shows it best results when it’s used on a concrete 
and meaningful compliance case. Therefore, it is essential that the compliance team 
identifies the right data and has a good understanding of the data structure within a 
company. The sheer volume of information, particularly from new sources such as so-
cial media, is growing rapidly. Bigger and better data give companies a more panoramic 
and granular view of their business environment and potential compliance pitfalls. This 
all makes it more difficult to detect the right data or to see the potential value of data. 
Often the existing IT architecture may prevent the integration of stored information, 
and managing unstructured data often remains beyond traditional IT capabilities. It is 
therefore important to ensure an adequate IT infrastructure when using Compliance 
Tech. 
 
Leveraging big data often means working across multiple disciplines such as IT, engi-
neering, finance and procurement, and the ownership of data is fragmented across these 
disciplines. Addressing these organizational challenges means finding new ways of col-
laborating across functions and businesses. In this regard, it might be also sensible to 			
17
  Michael Schrage, Why your analytics are failing you, Harvard Business Review (Apr. 8, 2014, 11:49 AM), 
https://hbr.org/2014/04/why-your-analytics-are-failing-you. 
18
  Dominic Barton & David Court, Making advanced analytics work for you, Harvard Business Review (Oct., 
2012, 11:53 AM) https://hbr.org/2012/10/making-advanced-analytics-work-for-you. 
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drive an integrated approach to data sourcing, model building, and organizational trans-
formation. 
 
Data privacy and data security laws are one area of law that any business using big data 
will have to take very seriously.19 In addition to local, state, national, and, even interna-
tional laws, there are many other potentially applicable standards and guidance’s. If a 
company uses Compliance Tech, it needs to ensure that its use is consistent with the 
above rules and regulations. In addition, as with many technological endeavors, big data 
analytics is prone to data breaches. Any data provided to a third party IT partner could 
get leaked, and needs to be protected accordingly. 
 
It would be naive to see Compliance Tech as a panacea to cure all the woes of a compli-
ance program. Although Compliance Tech is a remarkable tool that can help to enhance 
compliance efforts within a company, it is important to bear in mind that (a) the setup 
of a technology enhanced compliance program will take a considerable amount of time 
and effort and (b) that Compliance Tech has its inherent limitations. However, if these 
are understood properly Compliance Tech tools will be invaluable in compliance pro-
grams of the 21th century. 
			
19
  For more information refer to JAMES R. KALYVAS & MICHAEL R. OVERLY, BIG DATA: A BUSINESS AND 
LEGAL GUIDE 33 ff. (2015). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   Just about three months before the Volkswagen-manipulations of exhaust fumes were 
revealed and caused the biggest corporate scandal in the history of this carmaker, the 
group proudly published latest the results of their compliance-related measures. For 
VW, at that time the world still seemed to be in order. Due to an intensive preventive 
work, it was said, as a consequence of suspected independent controls, of “intensive 
investigations” and of checking “basic procedures”, one would conduct “a very effec-
tive”, successful and sustainable compliance management. Representatives of VW´s 
compliance department supported their statements by presenting the following figures: 
in the year 2014 every third employee (185.000 persons) had participated in compliance 
training events, the internal audit department had started investigations in 365 cases, 72 
employees had lost their jobs because of irregularities, and one had terminated contracts 
with business partners in 16 cases because they had given cause for suspicion.1 Further-
more, even the anti-corruption organization Transparency International in their sus-
tainability report at the end of 2014 ranked VW in the leading group of world`s largest 
transparent companies.2 
 
When shortly thereafter the scandal came to light, all these assurances and assessments 
turned out to be untenable assertions. The whole compliance management suddenly 
was left foolishly dangling in the winds. And especially after it was revealed that officials 
of VW already had been informed about possible illegal manipulation in 2011, the case 
raises the following questions: why did it to take so much time unless the fraud came to 
light? Where have the company`s inspectors been? What went wrong with the commu-
nication and cooperation between the internal investigators, the engineers and the man-
agement staff? Why could compliance not fulfill its purpose? Because the actual case of 
VW is not an isolated incident – similar phenomena of failing compliance procedures 
were already observed in cases like Siemens, Daimler or MAN –, this paper focuses on a 
general reason for the failure of compliance. 
 
In the following the reason for this will be primarily identified with failing processes of 
establishing legal norms within an organizational context. Therefore the text highlights 
the topic of failing compliance from an organizational sociological perspective based on 
observations made during a training seminar for compliance officers. Organizations, this 
will be the underlying basic assumption of the following argumentation, normally act as 			
1 Statements by Peter Dörfler, Head of Auditing and Stephan Wolf, Member of the Compliance Council of 
VW. 
2
 Transparency International Deutschland e.V., Nachhaltigkeitsberichte Deutscher Großunternehmen 
Wiederholungsstudie 2014, available at 
https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Wirtschaft/Nachhaltigkeitsberichte_ Grossun-
ternehmen_2014.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).  
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co-producers in processes of enforcing legal norms.3 
 
By using programs, guidelines, instructions and controls, they translate social law into 
internal, formal rules or “organizational law”. Such organizational activities are legally 
binding and normally there is nothing new or problematic with them. Implementing 
legislation, for example in the fields of consumer law, tax law or labor law, has a long 
history and has long been carried out by routine work. Members of organizations by 
and large became familiar with these topics and normally employees understand what is 
expected of them. This looks different in the field of corporate crime law. Here, a rou-
tine implementation of legal norms is difficult because business criminal law is a very 
dynamic and complex law sector, marked by numerous changes on the one hand. On 
the other hand a translation of legal norms is complicated for organizations here because 
of internal, structural reasons. This article will examine some of these reasons. The thesis 
is that in the case of compliance, the coexistence of organizational norms and legal rules 
(“hard law” and “soft law”) causes tensions and structural conflicts, because it disturbs 
the inner order, cooperative relationships and the role structure of the organization. 
Newly established compliance systems tend to undermine the legitimacy of legal norms, 
because they tend to prevent routine procedures of control, and they tend to fail to pro-
vide target groups with definite orientation. 
 
In the following sections such assumptions will be explored empirically. In a first step, 
general characteristics and consequences of compliance as a new form of control of 
white-collar crime are sketched from an organizational sociological perspective (II.). 
Second, expectations and perceptions of compliance officers will be described when it 
comes to implementing legal norms. These perceptions are reconstructed on the basis of 
a participant observation made during a training seminar for compliance officers in 
Germany (III.). The article concludes with a statement that identifies the problems of 
translating legal norms into organizational structures with the fundamental and struc-
tural characteristics of organizations as social forms (IV.).  
 
II. COMPLIANCE AND THE ORDER OF CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
   The ongoing boom of compliance as a subject and a market for corporations world-
wide can be explained by a change of the legal situation in the field of economic crime. 
Reflecting on the development in this field, one can say that there has happened a kind 
of “outcry” for control as a consequence of the scandals, accounting frauds and 			
3
  Lauren Edelman & Marc C. Suchman, When the Haves hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational 
Internalization of Law, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository (1999), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1802&context=facpubs (last visited Oct. 12, 
2015); SIM B. SITKIN & ROBERT J. BIES (eds.), THE LEGALISITIC ORGANIZATION (1994). 
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smashups around Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000nds. Since then the relevant 
laws have been continuously tightened. As a consequence of changes in corporate crim-
inal law, corporations are faced with increasing demands to take action themselves. The 
state and the public expect more “translation work” from business corporations. These 
are forced to launch new forms of control, and therefore new compliance systems are 
established in order to strengthen the link between organizational processes and legal 
norms.4 
 
What might this development mean for the internal structure of organizations and their 
orders of control? What kind of measures seems appropriate and reasonable to put the 
new legal norms into controlling practice? Controlling structures in organizations, this is 
an old and proven finding in organization sociology, work best when they are based on 
routines, clear cut tasks, comprehensible instructions and when they are embedded in 
satisfactory exchange relations.5 But in contrast to this, a new feature of the law-
compliance-control-constellation is a combination of various distinct requirements, 
heterogeneous purposes and demands on the firms. Besides an increase of regulative 
rules, judicial criminal controls and besides increasing liability risks, an increased sensi-
bility of the public towards economic crime constitutes an additional factor corpora-
tions have to take into consideration. Accordingly, organizations are expected to adapt 
to possible rule-breaking behavior or to violations of norms simultaneously in a preven-
tive, actively controlling and reactively-investigative manner. This bundle of necessities 
can lead to a mutual reinforcement of each sub-target of compliance, involving a re-
building of the organizational structure as a whole. By this, the new legal requirements 
show new characteristics in three dimensions: 
 
  With regard to the factual accuracy of organizational behavior and responsibili-
ties, the new regulatory-legal expectations are causes of disorder. They are less 
clearly and less uniquely defined as before and they are sometimes topically dif-
fuse. Different areas of organizational work can simultaneously be affected by 
the tightening of criminal law. Therefore, as a result of numerous new regula-
tions, grey areas between “still allowed” and “forbidden” ways of behavior in-
crease.  
  Concerning the social sphere of organizations, new social roles, new contact ar-
eas and new potential conflicts between employees can develop. Due to creating 
new compliance-jobs or departments, new responsibilities emerge in organiza-
tions that tend to collide with already existing controlling institutions (for in-			
4
  Ralf Kölbel, Wirtschaftskriminalität und unternehmensinterne Strafrechtsdurchsetzung, 91 MschrKrim, 22, 
22  (2008); Hans Krause Hansen, Managing corruption risks, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 251, 253f. (18.2011). 
5
  Jeffrey Pfeffer, The costs of legalization, in The Legalisitc Organization (Sim B Sitkim & Robert Bies 
eds.1994); ARNOLD. S. TANNENBAUM, CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 14ff. (1971). 
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stance the internal audit department). Relationships of trust, loyalties, work-
flows and routines can be jeopardized by compliance. 
  From a temporal perspective, the new compliance control differs from conven-
tional references to law insofar it is now put on a permanent footing. Now law 
as an external premise of organizational decision making is not a single, excep-
tionally activated medium anymore. Rather, it has developed to an ongoing 
background-theme of work, for example mentioned in regular trainings, in 
codes of conduct, in risk assessments or in monitoring processes. By compli-
ance, legal considerations in general are more strongly connected to everyday-
practices. 
 
To sum it up: the described factors and characteristics of compliance are meant to 
strengthen the connection between organizational and legal norms. Law shall be more 
“embedded”6 in organizational rules of procedures as well as in areas of responsibility. It 
is supposed to guide activities much stronger. For this purpose, controls become more 
formalized and differentiated, rules are modified. In general, one could say, for organiza-
tions the introduction of compliance takes on the character of a reform. But still today it 
seems to be generally difficult to implement these rights based compliance-reforms. 
Research on this topic, among other things, report on credibility problems or on a defi-
cient deterrence of corporate misconduct.7 
 
Regarding this, the crucial issue we are confronted with is how this problem presents 
itself from the point of view of compliance officers. How are problems of the transla-
tion/ implementation of legal norms practically articulated? We will discuss these ques-
tions on the basis of experiences made during a compliance-training seminar. 
 
III. CONSULTANCY EXPRIENCES IN THE FIELD OF COMPLIANCE 
 
   The observations described in the following result from data recorded during partici-
pation in a one-week further education seminar for business professionals and execu-
tives. This seminar, conducted in winter 2014, aimed at qualifying the participants as 
certified so called “compliance officers”. The total number of participants was 19, most 
of them being in charge of compliance, i. e. they were executives from organizational 			
6
  ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, WHEN FORMALITY WORKS 6 (2001). 
7
  Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 487, 490 f. (2003); Jonas Pape, Zur Wirksamkeit von Corporate Compliance, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 233, 236 (6.2009); CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE LEH-
MANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE (2011); Ralf Kölbel, Wirksamkeit und Funktionsbedin-
gungen von Compliance aus wirtschaftskriminologischer Sicht, in Handbuch Criminal Compliance 1443 (Rot-
sch ed., 2014). 
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supervisory departments (e. g. internal audit or legal department), most of whom work-
ing for bigger, sometimes internationally operating industrial, services or financial en-
terprises. In the course of the seminar, a total number of six different experts gave lec-
tures of four to eight hours every day, among them experts for commercial criminal law, 
a public prosecutor, a compliance officer from a DAX-30 enterprise as well as auditors. 
The lectures were, among others, on legal bases, liability risks, compliance organization, 
prevention, public prosecutor investigations, compliance in the commercial field, data 
protection and IT compliance as well as so called reactive compliance (internal investiga-
tions). The author made notes during his participation and fixed his observations in 
writing immediately after the end of the seminar. Furthermore, seminar-related docu-
ments were assessed, and there was the possibility to interview selected participants. 
 
A. The functions of Compliance 
 
Despite the participants showing a basically reserved attitude towards the topic of the 
seminar (“This is just a fashionable issue”; “We´re breaking a butterfly on a wheel”)8, the 
predominant opinion among the participants was that the establishment of compliance 
control in their own companies was necessary. The function of compliance – this be-
came clearly obvious by the questions and discussions – was first of all considered a 
means to be on the safe side when it comes to external prosecution and to avoiding lia-
bilities and image damages for their own companies. The lecturers and the future com-
pliance officers considered it their predominant task to protect colleagues from prosecu-
tion by the state: “This is what we´re all interested in: I must internally protect the staff 
member”. The prevention of business delinquency was only of secondary interest. Thus, 
from the point of view of those concerned – and this is a first astonishing insight – a 
crucial action-stimulating risk results rather from the activities of state supervision and 
sanctioning authorities than from the threat of potential business delinquents. The 
threat was symbolized by the figure of the prosecutor. The prosecutor, about whom 
jokes were made already on the first day, symbolized the hostile forces and bound the 
participants together. The threat scenario of a humiliating “visit” by the prosecutor 
together with his marauding customs officers appeared again and again (“The customs 
officers are always armed; they even come early in the morning when the children are 
still sitting at the table”), anecdotes of this kind were told eight times on the whole. Also 
the US American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was mentioned: “I´d ra-
ther like to have trouble with the Mafia than with the SEC”, one compliance officer was 
heard. “Take care that you´re on the safe side, because in case of doubt you are the scape-
goat”, was a lecturer´s advice concerning the topic “cooperation with authorities”. The 
repressive component of legal social control was much more emphasized than preven-
tive or protecting aspects. Expenses resulting from legal prosecution seemed to be much 			
8
  In the following, text in italics refers to quotations of seminar- participants. 
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weightier than possible damage by criminal business activities as such. Compliance func-
tions such as informing staff members of marketing issues were discussed in much more 
detail than functions such as risk assessment or criminal law prevention. 
 
B. Vagueness and Operationalization of Legal Norms 
 
According to my observations, one crucial problem from the point of view of those 
being in charge of compliance was that the norms, regulations and instructions were said 
to lack “concrete application examples and practical references”. “The dirty work of oper-
ationalizing”, as one interview partner had it, or the “question of implementation” were 
considered a core problem of their tasks. As far as exemplary cases were presented, one 
took them up thankfully and discussed them. In such cases it was most of all about find-
ing out about legal boundaries and about in which situations a legal norm could in 
which ways be practically implemented. This operationalization problem of legal norms 
can be exemplarily demonstrated by the example of the criminal law on corruption. The 
bête noire for those present was unclear limit between legal and illegal behavior in this 
field. Anti-corruption compliance, this is well known, is meanwhile considered an oblig-
atory element of each organizational set of regulations, however due to the “mazy” legal 
situation it is difficult to implement. This was confirmed during the seminar. All partic-
ipants estimated the risk of being liable under criminal or civil law to be high, however 
there was uncertainty when it came to the actual meaning of legal terms and thus also 
when it came to the actual design of effective compliance tools. For example, there was 
uncertainty concerning the “appropriate extent” of hospitality, the beginning of the 
“illegal preference“ of clients, or concerning the question of which people may be invited 
on which business-relevant occasions. There were different opinions about appropriate 
ways of control, in particular when it comes to sales staff. There were extensive discus-
sions about the fact that difference between legal cultivation of contacts and criminal 
corruption is difficult to define, in particular if a company operates within the scopes of 
different national laws und must take cultural differences concerning the habits of its 
clients into consideration. Against this background, it was said, the legal norms were 
damaging to business, in so far as they were said to ruin the trust in clients and business 
partners. In his branch, one participant stated, it had for decades been an essential ele-
ment of corporate identity to invite business partners. After all, one had been successful 
only because one had highly estimated “interpersonal relations”, and currently the topic 
was “completely exaggerated”. Staff members moving “in the minefields between crimi-
nality and social adequacy”, it was said, were increasingly feeling at a loss, and now one 
even had to “spy on them”. The fact that furthermore the appropriate trainings or tests 
for staff members were often at “kindergarten level” (approving laughter among those 
present) confirms the overall impression that in this legal field it is difficult to practice 
any organization-internal operationalization of legal norms and that these norms meet 
little acceptance. As it is easy to see, the function of law, i. e. coding social situations in 
such a way as to make them distinctive, is not fulfilled in this field. The problems looked 
similar in the fields of antitrust law, money laundering legislation and data protection 
law. One lecturer got at the heart of the problem connected to the operationalization of 
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the appropriate legal norms when stating: “One must work out clear rules and guidelines 
even if there is no explicit legal regulation.” 
 
C. Role Conflicts and Organization-internal Disregard 
 
Beyond the so far sketched legal norms-related problems of operationalization, the par-
ticipants in the seminar were also clearly under stress from inner-company role require-
ments as well as from thus connected conflicts and lack of recognition. Apart from tasks 
such as training, marketing and risk assessment, the compliance officers are most of all 
burdened by mediating and control tasks. The question of which tasks should be focus 
of a compliance officer in the ideal case was discussed by several participants. A conse-
quence of the basically both many and unclear responsibilities of the compliance officer 
is disrespect at the company. For example, one participant told at his company initially 
he had been treated as an annoying “miniature pinscher” by the board (he had to “beg” 
for resources), as a competitor by colleagues from the legal and internal audit depart-
ments, and as a “bloodhound” by the staff members. He then had to spent much effort 
on receiving recognition, by “canvassing from door to door”. To keep compliance pro-
cesses out of power struggles and clashes of interests or to prevent competition and rival-
ry, one lecture recommended: “Talk to everybody involved, talking is important”; for: “to 
survive in the long run you must not be a lone wolf”. At the same time, he said, the com-
pliance officer had to be careful to stay independent and not to interfere with the opera-
tive business. Thus, one had to be involved without being allowed to participate in deci-
sion-making, as was the paradox looking advice. There were several lectures and discus-
sions about this topic, the basic clarification of the compliance officer´s possibilities to 
influence and competences. According to these contributions, a compliance officer sel-
dom meets acceptance. During a lunch break a staff member of an internationally active 
industrial company told what the management of his company thinks about compli-
ance: “They [the management] don´t care about compliance, they say: `well, write a ten 
topics paper´, they stay among themselves, you won´t be allowed there”. Also other partici-
pants in the seminar told about lacking recognition at their companies as well as about 
the difficulties of wanting to advise and support colleagues on the one hand and, being 
internal controllers, the obligation to keep distance on the other. “How do you avoid the 
impression that you secretly report on colleagues?” was one question which was left unan-
swered. 
 
These spotlights on the seminar or on the problems told by the compliance officers 
illustrate that the role of the compliance officer seems to be characterized by difficult 
tasks, by conflicts and contradicting demands. On the whole, attending this seminar left 
the impression that the inner-organization implementation of given norms of criminal 
law by way of compliance is problematic in several respects: It does not reduce complexi-
ty (rather it creates new uncertainties), it does not seem to provide those involved with 
fixed points of orientation, it does not initiate any standardized procedures, and it does 
hardly support motivation and identification with formal control structures. However, 
making law valid within an organization requires support by recognized, transparent, 
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legitimation-providing rules. It seems as if it is still a long way to go until a system of 
rules which is secured by established knowledge stocks and serves as a basis of the legiti-
macy of norms of criminal law becomes institutionalized. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The starting point for the considerations here was the assumption that usually organiza-
tions contribute as co-producers to the making legal norms valid in society, by translat-
ing norms into formal organizational structures in the form of “secondary law” or “soft 
law”. Some problems when it comes to implementing such translation, embedding and 
control processes of legal norms in the case of compliance in the context of commercial 
criminal law have been exemplarily sketched on the basis of experiences made at training 
seminar for compliance officers. This way it has become clear that obviously compliance 
generates inner-organizational structural conflicts, as it ties organizational norms more 
closely to legal norms, thus blocking the system´s own mechanisms legal norms are usu-
ally based on. Among these mechanisms there belong clearly defined roles and compe-
tences, implementable procedures and routines, but also the possibility to make, if nec-
essary, trust-based adjustments of the inflexible framework of rules. Usually, efficient 
formal structures within an organization provide expectation-supporting certainty but 
also allow for flexibility; they are “informally embedded”. In the case of compliance-
control, both functions of organizational formality seem to fail: The structure does 
neither work as a stable point of reference one can rely on if necessary and which stand-
ardizes room for manoeuvre nor does it serve as a protective wall or ritual facade behind 
which one can make informal agreements. Non-transparency and flexibility – necessary 
preconditions for the functioning of organizational practice – are thus lost. The “costs 
of the statutory regulation of an organization”,9 the weakening of loyal relationships as 
well as the prevention of the capability to adjust are increased. If legitimacy is defined as 
the “generalized readiness to accept as yet undefined decisions within certain tolerance 
limits”,10 these costs or transparency expectations coming along with compliance in 
connection with criminal law make it ever more improbable. As a result of this legitima-
cy loss on the other hand commercial criminal law fails to act as a kind of social control, 
for it is hardly able any more to stabilize normative expectations. Thus, the intended 
privatization of commercial criminal law supports an erosion of norms, after all. This 
means that commercial criminal law as we know it is hardly able to keep its promise to 
prevent undesired or socially harmful conduct and to control business. 
			
9
  Pfeffer 1994, as cited above in footnote 5. 
10
  NIKLAS LUHMANN, LEGITIMATION DURCH VERFAHREN 28 (3rd Edition1983). 
